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

TASHKENT

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.

BUKHARA

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
K	Kommunist
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta
NT	New Times
PR	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL.IX, NO.4

EDITORIAL

"The only knowledge worth distributing", said John Burnet in his Romanes Lecture in 1923, "is living, first-hand knowledge, and that, from the nature of the case, can only be realized in its fullness by the few. It is, however, the only reservoir from which the needs of the many can be supplied, and it is therefore important to consider from time to time whether it is being maintained at the proper level." Few people will dispute the good sense of this observation; yet its application to the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and particularly to those of the Eastern republics, is fraught with a number of peculiar difficulties. It is important to understand just what these difficulties are and to what extent a genuine attempt is being made to overcome them.

Among the many respects in which the Soviet Union and the so-called Peoples Democracies differ from other countries two have particular relevance here: uninhibited travel and prolonged visits are in normal circumstances impossible; and all published literature, including the press, is under strict State control. This means that thorough, impartial and untrammelled observation is out of the question and that all information published inside the Soviet Union is regulated and filtered according to the current Party line. Although these facts must necessarily limit the amount of "living, first-hand knowledge" about the Soviet Union which is available to the outside world, imperfect realization both of these facts and of certain other prerequisites to the acquisition of knowledge about a foreign country, make matters even worse than they need be.

The considerable quantity of English writing on the Soviet Union falls broadly speaking into four categories. First, there is specialized writing based on the careful and critical examination of original Soviet publications. Most of this deals with such subjects as the

history of the Revolution, Communist theory and practice, the Soviet systems of government, of education, of justice. The greater part of it is objective in the sense that it aims at getting at the facts. It is not intended for popular reading and is usually expensive. Secondly, there is a large quantity of popular works which purport to "tell the truth" about life in the Soviet Union, usually on the basis of short visits. The quality of these books varies greatly. Some of the authors have no background knowledge, do not know Russian and are strongly prejudiced either for or against the Soviet regime. Books dealing with the eastern republics often contain interesting impressions of the ancient monuments of Samarkand and Bukhara, Uzbek children at play, and the rolling Kazakh steppe. Many of them faithfully record the statements made by Intourist guides and interpreters, which often differ markedly from Soviet writing on the same subject intended for internal consumption. Thirdly, there is official Soviet propaganda in English. This is often well produced and contains carefully selected facts which in general correspond with what can be seen during a short visit to the Soviet Union under Intourist auspices. Finally, there are direct translations from Soviet works. Apart from those done under Soviet auspices for propaganda purposes, the number of these is very limited since much Soviet writing seems turgid and hyperbolic when done into English. There is, moreover, no general handbook of the Soviet Union which for general interest, readability and objectivity can compare with, say, the official HANDBOOK OF BRITAIN prepared by the Central Office of Information.

In general, it can be said that failing facilities to traverse the length and breadth of a foreign country, visiting and staying in not only the large towns but also smaller towns and villages, with, of course, a thorough knowledge of the language, the best way to discover the facts about the living and social conditions in any country is to read what it has to say about itself. This is also true of the Soviet Union, in spite of the limitations and restrictions alluded to earlier. The amount of Soviet literature published in Russian on the topography, economy, culture (including history, education and the Fine Arts), and public services of the Union is prodigious, and although the impartial student will notice a large number of startling omissions and contradictions, there is no doubt that it contains a high proportion of indisputable fact. Moreover, since Government policy and the Party line are by no means constant, facts which were omitted or glossed over yesterday may be given great prominence today or tomorrow. The ordinary citizen or the specialist who wishes to inform himself about any particular branch of Soviet life, cannot, of course, be expected to read all this material, even if he has the requisite knowledge of Russian.

So far as is known to us, there are just two general reference works on the Soviet Union in English. Both of them are important works and should be in the hands of every author and journalist who wishes to write about Soviet internal affairs; they should, indeed, be consulted by all those good and douce people who believe that they can find out the truth about every or any aspect of Soviet life during a short visit to the USSR. The earlier of these books, Theodore Shabad's GEOGRAPHY OF THE USSR, published in 1951, is now unfortunately getting out of date. It remains, however, the most reliable work of its kind in English. The other, S.V. Utechin's EVERYMAN'S CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RUSSIA, was published this year. This is a work of much wider scope containing some two thousand and fifty articles on every conceivable aspect of Russian history and of life in the Soviet Union today. We do not claim to be experts on the Soviet Union as a whole, but we can testify that the very considerable amount of information on the eastern republics contained in this book is generally sound, although, of course, necessarily greatly condensed. The longer articles give details of the best Soviet and other books and periodicals on the subject with which they deal. It is compact enough to accompany the tourist wherever he goes and is worth all the popular literature on the USSR put together. We can only hope that the admirable Messrs. Dent and Sons will see their way to bringing out frequent new editions of or supplements to this book, which will otherwise go out of date very quickly and might eventually become in some respects dangerously misleading. At the moment, including as it does the results of the 1959 census, the book is quite up to date and can be used to verify the more mutable features of Shabad's GEOGRAPHY.

. . .

One respect in which both English and Russian travel literature on the Soviet Union is gravely deficient is the provision of adequate town plans. This is particularly felt by visitors to the great cities of Central Asia, which are remarkable not only on account of the many historical monuments which they contain, but for the evidence they provide of the modernization and other material achievements carried out during the past half century. So far as is known, Tashkent is the only city of which a street map on normal lines is available either in the Soviet Union or outside. Even this plan is out of date, not drawn to scale, incomplete, and inaccurate in many respects, and the tourist who uses it to try and find his way round the city very soon finds himself in difficulties. There are also small pictorial plans of Samarkand and Bukhara; but these only show a few of the main streets and give no idea of the general layout of the towns or their environs. Visitors to the large and thriving cities of Alma-Ata, Stalinabad,

Frunze and Ashkhabad are unable to find any kind of plan or map of these cities and their surroundings. That the Soviet views on town plans in general are somewhat unusual can be established by a glance at the small town-plans in the small ATLAS MIRA (Moscow, 1958). Those of large cities outside the Soviet Union all show airports and docks where these exist. The plan of London, for instance, is stretched far beyond even the area of Greater London to show a total of eight airports including Gatwick Airport 27 miles away. On the other hand, according to the plans in this Atlas, no Soviet republican capital appears to have any airport or docks at all. In the plans of Central Asian cities referred to above, that of Tashkent shows an aeroplane vaguely pointing in a direction where there are no roads or railways; one of Samarkand where the road to the airport is clearly indicated by an aeroplane; and the small pictorial plan of Bukhara where the road and distance to the airport are shown. All this does not seem to tally with the evident desire of the Soviet Government to attract more tourists to the USSR.

* * *

Ever since the early years of the Revolution the output of Soviet writing on the history of the peoples of Asia has been considerable. Until the early 1950s most of it took the form of articles in periodicals and short monographs, whose quality was very variable, partly because of their often unmistakable propaganda flavour, and partly owing to the frequent shift of emphasis and even of basic premise. During the past few years, however, there has been a perceptible change: the range of subjects has been extended to include more seemingly academic and non-political themes; documentation has been widened to include material from Western as well as from Russian and Asian sources; and much more substantial works are now appearing, many of them of composite authorship. It goes without saying, however, that all this work written as it is from a strictly "Marxist-Leninist" angle, still cuts right across most of the existing conceptions of Asian history.

Since the Revolution, and to a large extent even before it, Russian historical writing on Asia has been virtually ignored by Western as well as by Asian scholarship. Until the 1950s this neglect could have been partially excused on the ground of high propaganda content of Soviet historiography, although part of it was in fact always informed by good scholarship and had considerable political significance. The fact, however, that the serious and substantial works on Asian history now being published in the USSR still fail to attract any but the barest notice in the universities and learned societies of the West and of non-Soviet Asia suggests that the main reason is ignorance of the Russian language, which is still not recognized as an essential part of the Asian historian's linguistic equipment.

During the past five years the Central Asian Research Centre has been doing its best to draw attention to Soviet writing on all aspects of Asian affairs, including history. In addition to CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER and its own bi-annual bibliographies, the Centre regularly contributes to the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society reviews of Soviet historical works on the Muslim republics and their borderlands. It also initiated and edited the ANALYSIS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1959. Although all this work does draw attention to the great scope of Soviet writing on Asia, it is in effect merely scratching the surface of a largely unexplored field of research. The Centre cannot for instance, handle the substantial works of history just alluded to in such a way as to demonstrate in full detail the special nature of the Soviet approach to Asian history, which ignorance of Russian at present precludes all but a tiny minority of oriental historians from apprehending. To produce full translations with commentaries of all of them is clearly impracticable. A possible alternative might be for the books in question to be reviewed at length by Western experts having a sufficient knowledge of Russian. But in many subjects such as, for example, Indian history, experts with a knowledge of Russian either do not exist or are unwilling to give their attention to the matter. Besides, the reviewing of books whose contents are for one reason or another beyond the reach of all but one or two experts is a somewhat sterile activity.

The only solution of this problem, and that by no means a complete one, seems to lie in the preparation of abridged translations or précis. This, if done honestly and either with some background knowledge, or with frequent consultation with an expert, can give an adequate impression of a book, of its documentation, its arguments and its omissions. Properly organized the work of producing such précis of all considerable Soviet works on Asian (and also on African) history would not present any great difficulty. It is unfortunately beyond the Centre's present resources except in respect of a few books on subjects of which it may have special knowledge. It is partly with a view to demonstrating what it believes to be the practicability of this technique that the Centre now has under consideration the preparation of an abridged version with commentary of N.A. Khalfin's important new work POLITIKA ROSSII V SREDNEY AZII (The Policy of Russia in Central Asia).

I S L A M I N T H E U S S R

The following article has been adapted from one entitled "Organisation Officielle de l'Islam en URSS" by Hélène Carrère d'Encausse in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE, No.4 (52) of 1960. Madame Carrère d'Encausse is a well known authority on Soviet Muslim affairs and has compiled this article on the basis of Soviet source material and of personal visits to the Muslim republics. The only point on which we may venture to disagree with the author is her frequent reference in the original text of the article to 30 millions as the total of Muslims in the USSR. It is difficult to adduce evidence of the existence of more than 24.5 million actual or nominal adherents to Islam.

Administrative organization - Islamic publications - Religious instruction - The clergy - Syncretist practices and survivals and non-orthodox sects - Mosques and other institutions.

Administrative organization

The Muslim population of the USSR, amounting as it does to over 24,000,000, is the fourth largest Muslim element under the control of any one power. Apart from India, it is the largest Muslim community ruled by a non-Muslim state. Islam in the USSR is regulated by an official statute drawn up in accordance with Article 124 of the Soviet Constitution, which is incorporated as it stands, or with slight modifications, in the Republican Constitutions.(1) There are also administrative and financial statutes.

Information about the administrative organization of Islam in the USSR is limited to the very scanty details supplied from official sources. In general, the various Muslim communities are controlled by four spiritual directorates (nezarat, in Russian dukhovnoye upravleniye) which were founded in 1941 and are recognized by law. Three of these directorates deal exclusively with the Sunni communities of (a) European Russia and Siberia, (b) Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and (c) the North Caucasus and Dagestan. The fourth directorate controls both the Sunni and Shii communities of Transcaucasia.

1. Directorate for Sunni Muslims of European Russia and Siberia

Headquarters: Ufa (Bashkir ASSR).

President: Mufti al Hafiz-kalimullah al Hajj Shakir Khiyaleddin (a Kazan' Tatar).

Vice-President: Al Hajj Muhammad ibn Vildan Tuguzbay (Bashkir), Imam of the congregational mosque at Ufa.

Members of the Executive Committee:

Al Hajj Ismail Mushtari (Tatar), Muhtasib of the oblasts of Moscow and Rostov. Up to 1956, he was Imam of the Moscow mosque.

Kadi al-Hajj Yusif (Tatar), Muhtasib of the oblasts of Penza, Saratov, Tambov and Kuybyshev.

Kadi al-Hajj Yunus (Bashkir), Muhtasib of the Bashkir ASSR and Chelyabinsk oblast.

Up to December 1948, the president of this directorate was regarded as the supreme spiritual leader of all the Muslims of the USSR. Under the jurisdiction of the directorate are: the Bashkir and Tatar ASSRs, the Muslim districts of western Siberia, the Lower and Middle Volga, as well as the Muslim colonies of Moscow, Leningrad, Kasimov, Arkhangel'sk etc. The administrative language of this directorate is Kazan' Tatar.

2. Directorate for the Sunni Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan

Headquarters: Tashkent.

President: Mufti al Hafiz al Hajj Ziauddin Babakhan (elected 20.10.57).

Vice-President: Ismail Mahdum (Makhtum?) Satti.

Members of the Executive Committee:

Kadi Fazil Khoja Sadiq Khuda?

Kadi Alimkhan Khoja Shakir Khuda.

Mirza Mahmud Bahram, Imam Khatib of the Tila Sheikh mosque in Tashkent.

This is the most important directorate and has jurisdiction over the four republics of Central Asia. The administrative language is Uzbek.

3. Directorate for Sunni Muslims of the North Caucasus and Dagestan

Headquarters: Buinaksk (Dagestan ASSR).

President: Mufti Muhammad Hajji Qurban.

Vice-President: Sheikh Shamsuddin Abdullah (1955).

This has jurisdiction over the mountainous areas of the North Caucasus, namely, the ASSR of Dagestan, Checheno-Ingush ASSR (re-established in 1957), Kabarda-Balkar ASSR, North Ossetia ASSR, and the Autonomous Oblasts of Adyge and Karachay-Cherkess. It can be assumed that the authority of this directorate also extends to the Muslim communities of the Kuban and Terek valleys.

Owing to the multiplicity of languages used in the regions controlled by this directorate, it is unlikely that any of them has precedence as an administrative language. Only Arabic could serve as a lingua franca and it was in Arabic that Mufti Qurban made his speech at the Congress of Zagorsk in May 1952.

4. Directorate for the Sunni and Shii Muslims of Transcaucasia

Headquarters: Baku.

President: Sheikh ul Islam Hakimzadeh Sheikh Muhsin Sheikh Ali Oghly.

Vice-President: Efendizadeh Ibrahim Efendi Abd al Kermine (Karim?) Oghly.

The authority of this directorate extends to the whole Shii community of the USSR, to which the president himself belongs. The vice-president is also Mufti of the Sunni communities of Transcaucasia (Azerbaydzhan, Armenia and Georgia).

Smaller sects such as the Ismai'lis, the Bahais(2), the Ghulat (extremist) sects and the Yezidi(3) have no officially recognized spiritual directorate. They were not represented at the Congress of Zagorsk at which all the religious bodies recognized by the Soviet authorities were assembled.

Each spiritual directorate is administered by an Executive Committee of from seven to nine members who are elected by a regional congress composed of both clergy and laymen. Its president is the Mufti assisted by one vice-president and one secretary.(4) This committee is assisted by an assembly of delegates representing the

faithful of all the territories which come under the directorate. In the republics and oblasts under each directorate's jurisdiction it is generally represented by a kadi or imam-khatib appointed by the executive committee. Once every five years, the directorate is supposed to convoke a regional congress to elect a new executive committee, to confirm the nomination of the kadi, the imam and the muezzin, and to decide what new mosques shall be opened and what function exercised by existing mosques.(5) Relations between the spiritual directorates and the Government are regulated by the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR established in 1944. This council deals with all matters affecting religious sects, with the exception of the Orthodox Church. It is represented in each SSR or ASSR by a similar council attached to the Republican Council of Ministers. At oblast and kray level there is a representative attached to the executive committee of the local soviet.

This administrative organization has acquired its present form as the result of a series of Muslim congresses of which the known details are as follows:

(a) On 10 June 1942 a pan-Muslim congress was convoked at Ufa. The president was the Mufti of Ufa, Abdurrahman Rasul, who at that time had established himself as the supreme religious authority for all the Muslims of the Soviet Union.

(b) In November 1943, the first congress (kurultay) of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan met at Tashkent and appears to have put an end to the Mufti of Ufa's supremacy.

(c) In December 1948, 115 delegates attended the second congress of the Muslims of Central Asia at Tashkent. At this congress it was decided to open a medrese at Bukhara (later to be called the Mir-i-Arab) and to publish the Koran.

(d) In June 1954 the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia held a congress at the Great Mosque of Ufa.

(e) In May 1956 there was a congress of Sunni and Shii Muslims of Transcaucasia at Baku. In this, Shii delegates from Dagestan, European Russia and Central Asia took part.

(f) From 19 to 23 October 1957, the third congress of Muslims of Central Asian Kazakhstan took place at Tashkent with 150 delegates attending. At this congress, the new president of the spiritual directorate, Ziauddin Babakhan(6) was elected.

The precise role of the spiritual directorates is difficult to establish. Raghib Ahsan a Pakistani who travelled extensively in Central Asia, arrived at the conclusion that "the mission of the spiritual directorate is not to propagate religion and give religious instruction, but to control religion in the name of the Central Government of the Soviet Union."(7)

Islamic publications

Before the Revolution, there were 23 Muslim printing presses in Russia, 196 libraries specializing in Muslim literature, and 18 religious periodicals. At present, there seems to be no Muslim printing press; religious publications are limited to those issued by the spiritual directorates and these appear to be printed in Party presses. So far as can be determined, Islamic religious publications are virtually confined to the Koran, whose publication was first permitted in 1948, a few Muslim religious calendars, a kind of Muslim catechism and two periodicals in Arabic characters. Details of these publications are very meagre and are to some extent contradictory. For instance, it is by no means clear when the first edition of the Koran was published and how many editions have been published since. Only one edition seems to have been received in the West, namely, that published in A.H.1375 (A.D.1955-6) by the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This is an edition of 567 pages printed at what is called the Fourth Printing Press of Tashkent (Tashkent shahri dordunju basma-khane), which is thought to be the same press which prints the Russian and Uzbek Party newspapers. Although technically well printed in Arabic, this edition is said to contain numerous typographical errors in addition to the 33 included in a list of "corrigenda" inserted at the end of the work. Apart from the Koran, the only other religious work whose publication has ever been announced is a book called ISLAM-I (MUSUL'MANSKOYE) BOGOSLUZHENIYE (Muslim Form of Service) by Mufti Shakir ibn Sheikh ul Islam Akhballiddin (sic Iqbaluddin?), Head of the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia (1957). This notification appeared in KNIZHNAYA LETOPIS' No.39 of 1957, p.90. No place of publication is given, but the book is said to contain 69 pages of text in Kazan' Tatar in Arabic characters, with a lithograph portrait and 23 photographs. It is probably identical with a publication called ISLAM VE IBADAT (Islam and Worship) referred to by the Mufti of Ufa in 1957.(8) From time to time mention has been made of a Muslim periodical in Kazan' Tatar in Arabic characters published at Ufa and another in Uzbek in Arabic characters published in Tashkent; but no copy of either of these journals has ever come to hand. Indeed, while Soviet pilgrims returning from Mecca in 1956 announced the forthcoming publication of these journals, those who followed them in 1957 denied all knowledge of them.

On the other hand, some of the religious calendars published every year by the spiritual directorates have reached the West, notably that for the year A.H.1373 (1953-4) published in Tashkent. Its 12 pages are in Uzbek in Arabic characters and the Uzbek title is Urta Aziyya ve Qazaqstan Musl̈imanlary Diniye Nezaratining Dini Kalindary (Religious Calendar of the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan). Two thousand five hundred copies of this calendar were printed in the press of PRAVDA VOSTOKA and KIZIL UZBEKISTAN. In A.H.1377 (1957-8) 10,000 copies(9) were printed, which seems to indicate a considerable increase in the official activities of the Muslim administration.

Finally, although there is no longer a Muslim library in the Soviet Union, a Pakistani visitor to Tashkent in 1957 estimated the number of volumes available in the library of the Spiritual Directorate there at 8,000. But of these only 250 books were in Arabic.(10)

Religious instruction

Although Article 128 of the Soviet Constitution forbids religious instruction in State schools, the existence of schools exclusively devoted to religious instruction is legally permissible. As regards Islam, the situation appears to be as follows. From 1917-41 all the Muslim religious schools were closed.(11) Reports on the situation which has developed since 1941 are conflicting. On his return from Bukhara in 1950(12), General Tubert wrote, "for the training of the clergy there is a medrese at Bukhara with 100 pupils. These are only admitted after they have completed the seven years education which are obligatory throughout the Soviet Union. Another medrese is under construction in Tashkent." In the same year, this information was confirmed by the Mufti of Tashkent in an address to a delegation of Algerian Muslims.(13) On the other hand, in 1952 a Pakistani, Mubarak Saghir, reported that there was a Koranic university at Samarkand with 500 students and several hundred religious schools in Uzbekistan. It seems probable that Mr. Saghir mistook the State University of Uzbekistan at Samarkand for a Koranic university.

Up to 1956 there was only one medrese, or Islamic theological college, in the Soviet Union. This was the Mir-i-Arab medrese in Bukhara. It was originally founded in 1535-6 by Khan 'Ubaidullah for Sheikh Abdullah al Yamani who was known in Persian as Mir-i-Arab or Prince of the Arabs. At the time of the Revolution it was closed, but was officially re-opened in 1952 as the "Higher Ecclesiastical Institute" of the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In 1953-4, it contained 100 pupils, all boarders, and in 1956, 105. This is the college's maximum capacity since it has only

50 hujra (cells) each accommodating two persons. Students entering the medrese must be at least 20 years old and possess a diploma from the 10 year school.(14) The students wear a gown with green, grey and red stripes. Most of them come from Central Asia, but a few hail from the Caucasus, Tatarstan and Bashkiria. In June 1958, the Imam of Alma-Ata stated that there were no pupils from Mulla families, the medrese pupils coming from homes of every type and from every region. Candidates for the medrese are selected by the Spiritual Directorate of Tashkent in collaboration with the Directorate for Religious Affairs attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR.(15) Full details of the college syllabus were obtained by Alessandro Bausani and published in ORIENTE MODERNO, August-September 1954. The medium of instruction is Uzbek written in Arabic characters. Otherwise, the curriculum is much the same as in any other medrese in Dar-ul-Islam, except that instruction appears to be on a very low level. The college does not train pupils for the higher clerical offices such as ulema, kadi or mufti, but merely as Koran readers, muezzin and khatib. In 1955, three graduates from Mir-i-Arab were admitted to the Muslim University of Al Azhar. After an examination, two of the students were admitted to the third year course and one to the first year course. According to the Cairo newspaper AKHIR SA'A(16), their knowledge of Arabic was very poor and their educational level equivalent to the Egyptian matriculation. Moreover, they were unable to intone the Koran in the stipulated manner.(17)

It is possible that it was the low standard of the Mir-i-Arab which led to the inauguration of a second medrese in Tashkent in 1958. This was the medrese Barak Khan whose course of studies was planned to last nine years as opposed to the Mir-i-Arab medrese's five years. It has since been reported that the staff and pupils of the Mir-i-Arab have been transferred to the Barak Khan medrese and that there is again only one theological college in the USSR. It is rumoured, however, that clandestine Koranic schools exist in various places and that individual imams may give lessons in liturgical Arabic. This last was confirmed by the Imam of Alma-Ata.

The clergy(18)

In Soviet official parlance the term mulla is used to describe all grades in the Muslim hierarchy. The Muslims of Central Asia and Transcaucasia are themselves accustomed to apply this word to anyone who knows Arabic, while graduates from a medrese are given the Persian title of akhund.

At the outbreak of the Revolution there were in Russia (not counting the semi-independent states of Bukhara and Khiva) a total of 45,339

Muslim clergy.(19) The majority of these disappeared in the purges of 1932-8. There are no official figures for the present number, but Professor Berthold Spuler, a well known and reliable authority on the subject, gives the total number of mullas as 8,052 and of heads of fraternities (mostly Sufi) such as ishan and sheikh, as 282. This figure seems to cover only those who are officially recognized as belonging to the Spiritual Directorate. Most of these are elderly persons whose ranks have received only a meagre reinforcement from the Mir-i-Arab since its re-opening. Nevertheless, it seems that ever since the Revolution the custom has persisted of electing unofficial mullas from among those of the faithful who have some knowledge of Arabic and who come from the poorest classes of the population.(20) It is mostly these unofficial clergy who officiate at such family ceremonies as circumcision, marriages and funerals.

Apart from the performance of religious rites and officiating in the small number of mosques, the activities of the officially recognized clergy are very limited. They cannot teach, since education is the responsibility of the State and the Party; but it appears that they do give some religious instruction in private houses.(21) They are forbidden to take part in any social activity. Their salaries and all their expenses are the responsibility of the faithful, nothing at all being paid by the State. The contributions of the faithful are paid to the imam of the various mosques, who sends them to the Spiritual Directorate to which he belongs, and this body disburses his salary.(22) On the whole, the material condition of the clergy seems to be satisfactory. In 1955, the salary of the Imam of the Moscow mosque was 2,000 rubles a month, plus allowances, and a car was put at his disposal.

In the circumstances, it would seem unlikely that the Muslim clergy exercise any great spiritual influence over their flocks. Soviet ethnologists, however, insist that not only is Islam very much alive in certain districts but that a revivalist movement is in progress. The well-known expert Snesarev(23) has stated that "in districts where Islam was once widespread a religious movement is about to be born under our very eyes. This movement is striving to reconcile the (Muslim) religion with present conditions. It is willing to accept every compromise and is seeking to modernize Islam." The noted anti-Islamic propagandist, Klimovich, has recently supported Snesarev's thesis(24): "Religious organizations are beginning to adapt themselves to the new conditions," he writes. "They are striving to bring Islam into line with our own times. They claim that the dogmas of Islam are democratic and even proletarian. Muslim dignitaries are interpreting passages from the Koran and religious mythology in a new way and are trying to reconcile rites and customs with science. This tendency to

adapt Islam to the realities of life is equally noticeable in the effort to bring together the various rites and sects of Islam."

Syncretist practices and survivals, and non-orthodox sects

While the legalized activities of the spiritual directorates are now either tolerated or ignored, the Soviet authorities keep up a steady campaign against syncretist survivals and unorthodox sects. The offences to which the strongest objection is taken are public preaching and collective prayers outside the mosques both of which are strictly forbidden. Prayers for rain and visits to the tombs of saints are also strongly condemned. The practice of medicine by mullas is also subjected to strong criticism.(25) Many of the attacks in the Soviet press are characterized by a remarkable ignorance of Islamic history and practice, many of the practices condemned being merely pre-Islamic survivals.

Even more serious than syncretist practices in the eyes of the Soviet authorities is the existence of fraternities or brotherhoods, mostly connected with Sufism. Before the Revolution many of these fraternities flourished on Russian soil, for example, Naqshbandiya(26), Yasawiya(27), Qadriya(28), Suhrawardiya(29), and Sultaniya(30). On the eve of the Revolution, these sects (or tariqah as they should be called), were beginning to decline in Central Asia but they were still important in the North Caucasus and in Dagestan. Between 1921 and 1922 the Soviet Government ordered the dissolution of all brotherhoods and tariqah, but the latter seem to have survived sub rosa. At the end of the Second World War the formation of religious bodies recognized by the civil authorities and able to acquire property was authorized provided that they had at least 20 members. In spite of this the brotherhoods (zawiya) are still condemned by the authorities and often even by Muslim religious leaders. The tariqahs, however, have to some extent resumed their activities. A. Khakimidzhanov writes (31), "In several parts of Kazakhstan the revival of Muslim religious orders has been noticed, in particular of the "Kutun Khodzha" (a branch of the Yasawiya)." S.M. Abramzon too, in the account of his ethnographic expedition to the Tyan'-Shan'(32) says that in the district of Ak-Talinsk (Kirgiz SSR) he saw a Sufi brotherhood called "Alka" whose followers were studying religious books under the direction of a murshid. Snesarev also reveals the existence of Sufi sisterhoods among the Uzbeks of Khorezm. He describes in detail one of them which in 1956 used to meet at intervals in the district of Khanki (Uzbek SSR) to perform a zikr.(33) He points out, however, that the Sufi zikr (ecstatic trance) shows signs of declining into a shamanist ritual at Khorezm where, he says, the members of the brotherhood are imperceptibly being transformed into "witch doctors".

Whatever the nature of the survivals, the very fact of their existence are indications of the small impact which Party ideology has had on the masses.

Mosques and other institutions

In 1913 there were reported to be 26,279 mosques for an estimated total of 16,200,000 Russian Muslims.(34) A later and Communist estimate was that while in Russia there was one Orthodox parish for every 10,000 to 12,000 inhabitants, there was a mosque with officiants for every 700 to 1,000 Muslims.(35) In 1900 it was estimated that in Turkestan alone, without counting the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, there were 1,503 congregational mosques and 11,230 parish mosques with a total of 12,499 imams to minister to 6,000,000 inhabitants; that is, one mosque for every 471 believers.

The anti-religious campaign which has been conducted by the Government with varying degrees of intensity since 1918 has greatly reduced the number of mosques open for religious services and has decimated the clergy. After the purges of 1936 to 1938 there were hardly any mosques left open even in the big cities of Turkestan. Since then, however, and particularly since 1943, there has been some improvement and some mosques have been reopened and new ones built. In the official and other reports about the number of mosques opened since 1942 there is so much variation and contradiction that it is impossible to arrive at the truth. In 1942 SOVIET WAR NEWS(36) reported that there were 1,312 mosques open in the whole of the USSR. In 1947 the Egyptian press gave a figure of 2,000(37), and according to a statement made by the Mufti of Tashkent in 1950, this figure had risen to 3,000.(38) In 1956 Edouard Sablier recorded two entirely different figures: 8,000 mosques and meeting rooms according to the President of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults in Moscow; and 1,800 according to the four Grand Muftis.(39)

The highest of these figures would be inadequate for a Muslim population of over 24,000,000, but in point of fact even the lowest figures seem to be greatly exaggerated by comparison with reports from other and apparently more reliable sources. In 1953 the Mufti of Tashkent stated that there were from 50 to 60 mosques open for public worship in the whole of Uzbekistan. This may well be correct, but his estimate of 200 to 300 for the whole of Turkestan (including Kazakhstan) is almost certainly exaggerated. In June 1958 the Imam of Alma-Ata said that in the whole of Kazakhstan, with its Muslim population of more than 3.5 million, there were 27 mosques open, one in each of the oblast capitals and the remainder distributed among the various towns of the republic.

No such recent statements are available for the other Muslim regions of the USSR. It seems, however, that the proportion of mosques to the Muslim population of the Caucasus is likely to be very much higher than those of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Soviet sources report 2,000 mosques in the autonomous republic of Dagestan in 1928(40) and 2,675 in the Chechen republic in 1931(41). In 1946 it was reported that in almost every Lezghin aul (Dagestan ASSR) there was a mosque open for religious services.(42)

During the past few years a good deal of information has been released about the restoration of old mosques, the reopening of disused mosques and also the building of new ones. But the figures given are often contradictory or have been invalidated by impartial witnesses. For instance, on 24 March 1957, Moscow radio announced that more than 100 large mosques and mausoleums dating from the Middle Ages were being restored in Central Asia. In October 1957, at the Third Congress of Muslims of Central Asia, the Mufti of Tashkent stated that 50 large mosques and seven mausoleums were being restored in Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. Outside these two republics, however, there are virtually no large medieval mosques in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Even as regards Tashkent it seems to be impossible to arrive at the truth. In 1900 there were 111 congregational mosques and 230 parish mosques. In 1952 a Pakistani visitor stated that he had seen there 20 congregational and several hundred parish mosques,(43) while an Algerian delegation two years earlier had estimated the number as 17 congregational and 50 parish mosques.(44) In 1954, the Mufti of Tashkent told a visitor that there were 16 mosques open. In January 1956 an American journalist(45) counted 18 mosques, but doubted if they were all in use. Lastly, in 1957, a delegation of Pakistani ulema could only find 10 mosques in all.(46) The existence of only four functioning mosques has been fully confirmed: the Tila Sheikh mosque, which seems to have been open since 1953 and can hold a congregation of 3,500; the congregational mosque of Rakit, apparently opened for public worship in 1956 and able to hold a congregation of 1,000(47); the mosque of Barak Khan; and the mausoleum Imam Kaf Hali Hajji.

Samarkand, which had more than 100 mosques before the Revolution, seemed to have only one mosque in use in 1948 - that at the Shah-i-Zindeh mausoleum. In 1954, a foreign visitor found a total of three, and two years later the American journalist Sulzberger saw several mosques of which only one, however, appeared to be open during the hours of prayer. On 24 March 1957, Moscow radio announced the opening of a new mosque in Samarkand. But in June 1958, Madame Carrère d'-Encausse could only find three mosques in use, one of which was the Shah-i-Zindeh. In 1917, Bukhara had 360 mosques, but in 1954 there

were only four small mosques, one of them the parish mosque of Hoja Zaineddin, dating from the 16th century. On 24 March 1957 Moscow radio announced the opening of a new mosque there also.

Details about mosques in other towns in Central Asia and Kazakhstan are even harder to come by. Dzhelalabad (Jalalabad), the second largest town in Kirgizia, had only one parish mosque in 1954. In 1957 Osh, also in Kirgizia, had only one congregational mosque whose building was announced by Moscow radio on 24 March 1957. Stalinabad, built on the site of Dushambeh, a village with one mosque, was said to have four mosques in 1954. In 1957 the Tadzhik press mentioned 10 mosques, three of them large ones: Jambi (Shambeh?) Koktash and Shahmansur(48), but a delegation of Pakistani ulema saw only three of them in 1957, one of them being of very recent construction.(49) The existence of mosques in most of the towns visited by foreigners has been reported but there are few details about numbers. Kokand which had 247 mosques in 1917 seems now to have only one in use. Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, was reported to have only one mosque in 1952, and still only one in June 1958. A good example of contradictory information is that concerning the famous Dungan mosque in Przheval'sk. This was built in 1910 in the Chinese style (see CAR, Vol.IX, No.2, p.119). In 1947, a Soviet source said that this mosque had been restored to the Muslim religion in 1945;(50) but nine years later SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA was still speaking of "the former Dungan mosque".(51)

Details about the numbers of mosques in the Caucasus are very scanty. Although there appear to be far more mosques in use in small towns and even villages, a foreign visitor could only find one congregational and one small mosque in Baku in 1956, that is to say, exactly what a Soviet source had reported in 1937.(52)

The true position is equally uncertain with regard to the territory coming under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Directorate of European Russia. There is one large congregational mosque in Ufa. In Kazan', the congregational mosque of Merjani, dating from 1895, was restored and reopened for worship in 1957. Ishimbay, Orenburg, Astrakhan', Penza, Saratov, Tambov, Kuybyshev, Chelyabinsk, and Perm' are all known to have mosques. Moscow has one congregational mosque dating from 1908 and situated in the Vypolzov Pereulok.

The Islamic institution known as waqf, or the inaliable mortmain property of the religious foundation, no longer exists in the USSR. The expropriation of the waqf was carried out in stages between 1920 and 1925 and was justified by fatwa (legal ordinance) of the ulema.(53) Today mosques and medreses are maintained by associations of the faithful which are recognized by the State as civil bodies allowed to use the buildings for religious purposes, but not to own them.

This brief outline of the official fabric of Islam in the USSR shows that the religion has an incontestable right to existence, but that its power and possessions have dwindled to almost nothing. Although the exact number of practising Muslims is not known, it is certain that the number of mosques and officiating clergy is not enough for their requirements. This aspect of the matter alone gives rise to fears for the future of Islam. It is, however, necessary to observe that the closing of mosques and the disappearance of the clergy, however regrettable it may be, do not have quite the same effect on Muslims as the closing of churches and the disappearance of priests would have on Catholics. As long as there is somewhere in the world a man who remembers that his ancestors used to say "la ilaha illallah", the possibility will remain that Islam can rise again from its ashes, and the situation of that man will be far less parlous than that of a Christian deprived of his sacraments.

Notes

(1) In order to ensure freedom of conscience for its citizens the USSR has separated the Church from the State and teaching from the Church. All citizens are free to practise a religion or to spread anti-religious propaganda (Article 124 of USSR Constitution). Cf. Constitution of Kirgiz SSR (Article 95); Tadzhik SSR (Article 3); Azerbaydzhan SSR (Article 131); Kazakh SSR (Article 101); Uzbek SSR (Article 123); Turkmen SSR (Article 101); Tatar ASSR (Article 91); Bashkir ASSR (Article 91); Dagestan ASSR (Article 98).

(2) The heterodox sect of the Bahai was founded at the end of the last century by the Persian Bahaullah (1817-1892), a disciple of Ali Muhammad, known as the 'Bab'. It is a syncretist schism, derived from Babism, which holds out the prospect of a universal religion, capable of being superimposed on all others.

(3) The Yezidi (Shaitanperest = devil-worshippers) are even further removed from Islam, their religion being derived from the ancient zoroastrian or manichean dualism. Kurds by language and descent, the Yezidi in the USSR were 16,522 strong in 1922, all living in Armenia.

(4) Tass, 17.2.56. Report on the Congress of Transcaucasian Muslims.

(5) Statement of the Mufti Khiyaletdinov, President of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of European Russia and Siberia - Broadcast by the Voice of National Independence and Peace (Bucharest), 24.6.55.

This council is authorized to deal with the following matters:

(a) To present to the State organs the demands of the religious organizations in cases where these demands necessitate Government authorization (control of religious establishments, printing presses etc.).

(b) To draft laws and decrees which affect the religious organizations.

(c) To keep a watch on the application of governmental decisions relating to the law on the separation of Church and State and the application of those measures which grant religious freedom to believers.

(d) To assist the religious organizations in the solution of all problems necessitating contacts with the State organs. (See B.S.E. Moscow, 1948, p.1788.)

(6) Radio Moscow in Arabic, 25.10.59.

(7) ISLAMIC REVIEW, February 1958, p.31.

(8) Radio Moscow, 20.3.57.

(9) Cf. KNIZHNAYA LETOPIS, No.2, 1958, p.105.

(10) Mawlana Raghib Ahsan, ISLAMIC REVIEW, February 1958, p.30.

(11) Moreover, it is difficult to say exactly how many there were: for example in 1908 in Turkestan alone there were 6,107 mektebs for boys with 6,361 teachers and 14,208 pupils; medreses with 459 mudarris and 14,375 students; this does not take into account the femals religious schools (9,773 pupils), those reserved for the blind (4,681 pupils) etc.; cf. A.P. Savitskiy, TRUDY SAGU, 1956, pp.53-71.

(12) L'OUZBEKISTAN, RÉPUBLIQUE SOVIÉTIQUE, éd. du Pavillon, 1951, p.127.

(13) ALGER RÉPUBLICAIN, 20.12.50.

(14) The Soviet authorities have noted this with dismay. S. Babayev, First Secretary of the CC said at the IVth Plenum of the Turkmen Communist Party (25-26 February 1957) that "only the low level of anti-religious propaganda and ideological work among young people can explain why certain diploma students of our Soviet schools turn to the Muslim religious establishments." (Cf. TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 27.2.57.)

(15) AL HAJJ EL ARIF BEN SULTAN, "Soviet Propaganda in the Near and Middle East", Munich, No.1, 1958, p.7.

(16) 26.3.55. "The First Russian Students at Al Azhar".

(17) But A. Bausani notes, in the article quoted above, that when they passed through Cairo in 1953 certain Muslim leaders, notably the Rector of Mir-i-Arab, astonished the Egyptians by the remarkable way in which they psalmodized the Koran.

(18) For the sake of simplicity the term 'clergy' has been used although in fact, orthodox Islam has no clergy. The USSR has set up ecclesiastical institutions in the form of an essentially administrative character which are not always 'sacerdotal hierarchies' in the sense in which this term might be understood by a Christian. The same applies to the terms 'cult' and 'officiants' which are frequently employed for want of a more exact term, but which fail to translate conceptions peculiar to Islam.

(19) M.S. Rybakov, "Statistics of Muslims in Russia on 1 January 1912" in MIR-ISLAMA, No.XI, 1913, pp.269-71. In the Province of Turkestan alone (without counting Bukhara and Khiva) which had six million inhabitants in 1900, there were 12,499 mosque imams (i.e. one for each 480 inhabitants), A.P. Savitskiy, op.cit. For Dagestan alone Samurskiy (DAGESTAN, Moscow, 1925, p.129) gives for 1924 the probably greatly exaggerated figure of 40,000 clergy. Astemirov ("Results of Cultural Work in Dagestan", K 15 Letiyu Oktyabrya, REVOLUTSIYA I NATSIONAL'NOSTI, brings the figure up to 3,991 for the year 1929. In the Chechen country, ANTIRELIGIOZNIK (November 1931, p.72) accounted for 1,539 clergy.

(20) A. Kovalev "Bashkiriya na novom etape razvitiya kulturnoy revolutsii", REVOLUTSIYA I NATSIONAL'NOSTI, 1932, pp.92-96.

(21) Statement by Ismail Mustafayev, Imam of the Moscow mosque, to a Trade Union delegation from Libya (Moscow, 24.6.55): "Religious instruction is forbidden in schools but may be given at home." This is corroborated by a statement made by the Imam of Alma-Ata to a French visitor (June 1958).

(22) Statement by the Imam of Alma-Ata, June 1958.

(23) SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, No.2, 1957, p.60.

(24) Radio Moscow, 22.5.58 (In Russian), "Sovremennyy Islam".

(25) Abdul Majid Pulatov "Suyeveriye i predrassudki - vragi zdorovya", KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 24.7.57.

(26) A Sufi order founded by Muhammad ibn Muhammad Baha-ud-Din al Bukhari Naqshbandi (died 1388, buried at Bukhara). The Naqshbandi were widespread in Turkestan, the North Caucasus, Dagestan (Murids of Shamil) and in Kazan'. In 1862 a Kazan' Tatar, an initiate of the Brotherhood called Baha-ud-Din, founded a puritan religious movement of the wahhabite type, the 'Wais' movement (from the name 'Owais ibn Qurani', a companion of the prophet). This seemingly 'Tolstoyan' movement has agrarian and anarchist tendencies and is especially opposed to military service. It has been influenced by Russian Dukhobor sects.

(27) A branch of the 'Khwadjagan' sect founded in the 12th century by Sheikh Yasawi, who died in 1167. It is widespread in Turkestan, Kazakhstan, the Urals and in the Middle Volga Region.

(28) A Bagdad order founded in the 12th century and widespread in Turkestan (Samarkand was its chief centre).

(29) A Bagdad order founded by Abd el Qahir Suhrawardi (died 1167); had initiates in Turkestan.

(30) A recent order (19th century) with initiates in Turkestan.

(31) KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 17.9.54 ("The Reactionary Nature of Islam").

(32) Cf. KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYE INSTITUTA ETNOGRAFII, No.IV, 1948.

(33) SOV. ETNOGRAFIYA, 2/1957, p.61.

(34) MIR ISLAMA, of St.Petersburg, No.11, 1913, pp.269-74.

(35) Mir Said Sultan Galiyev METODY ANTIRELIGIOZNOY PROPAGANDY SREDI MUSULMAN (Methods of Anti-Religious Propaganda among the Muslims), Moscow, P.C. for Nationalities, 1922, p.11.

(36) Edition of 16 May 1942.

(37) AL MISRI 30.6.42; AL AHRAM, 28 April 1947, quoted by Bertold Spuler in "Condition of Muslims in the USSR since 1944", ISLAMIC LITERATURE, Lahore, December 1955, pp.25-28.

(38) ALGER RÉPUBLICAIN, 20.12.50.

(39) "Au pays de l'Islam rouge", LE MONDE, 5.7.56.

(40) Astemirov, "Account of the Cultural Structure in Dagestan" in REVOLUTSIYA I NATSIONAL'NOSTI, No.10-11 of 1932, p.100 onwards.

(41) ANTIRELIGIOZNIK, No.11, November 1931.

(42) L.B. Panek, "Trudy Yuzhno-Dagestanskoy Ekspeditsii", KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYE INSTITUTA ETNOGRAFII, VI, 1948.

(43) Mubarak Saghir, DAWN, Karachi, 17.5.52.

(44) ALGER RÉPUBLICAIN, 20.12.50.

(45) M. Sulzberger of the NEW YORK TIMES, quoted by ISLAMIC REVIEW, April 1956.

(46) ISLAMIC REVIEW, February 1958 and TA'SIRAT-I-RUS (Memories of Russia) by Mawlana Badayuni, Karachi, 1957 (in Urdu).

(47) Radio Moscow, 24.3.57.

(48) KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 12.7.57.

(49) ISLAMIC REVIEW, February 1958, p.30.

(50) G.G. Stratanovits "Ochet ob ekspeditsii k dunganam Kirgizii, KR. SOOB. INSTITUTA ETNOGRAFII, III, 1947, p.38.

(51) 25.2.56.

(52) A.S. Ibragimov, ANTIRELIGIOZNIK, 6/37, pp.41-43.

(53) Cf. Vincent Monteil, ESSAI SUR l'ISLAM EN URSS, Geuthner, Paris, 1952.

TSARIST TAXATION IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1860-80

The following is a summary of A.P. Pogrebinskiy's article "Nalogovaya politika tsarizma v Sredney Azii v 1860-1880 godakh" (AN/SSSR, Institute of History, ISTORICHESKIYE ZAPISKI, No.66, 1960). It is a well-documented article, based on a number of contemporary printed sources and MSS in the Central State Archives in Leningrad and the Central State Military History Archives. The author's conclusions concerning the oppressiveness of Tsarist fiscal measures considerably differ from those of Richard A. Pierce who in his RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA, 1867-1917 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960) says, "Taxation, a thorny problem anywhere, was cleared [by the Russians] of the confusion which had characterized it under native rule, and was to a large degree eased." (P.152) As the bulk of Pogrebinskiy's source material is not available to Western scholars it is difficult to assess how far the picture he draws is an objective and scholarly one. In Central Asia, more perhaps than elsewhere in the Russian Empire, the Soviet regime came in, as it were, on the backs of the Tsarist conquerers. It is perhaps consciousness of this fact that constrains Soviet writers to paint as black a picture as possible of Tsarist administration.

The conquest of Central Asia by Russia involved the establishment of a tax system in the new territories. The campaigns against Kokand, Khiva and Bukhara were very costly; moreover, after the conquest, an army 50,000 strong remained for a long time in the governor-generalship of Turkestan. This, as well as the large police organization had to be maintained at the expense of the country.

Peculiarities of the local economic and landholding systems made the introduction of the Russian taxation methods impracticable. The Russians therefore decided to adapt the traditional native forms of taxation to the new circumstances. This applied to both taxes and the ways of levying them.

Settled population

The Governor-General, Kaufman, followed the existing division of the population for taxation purposes into settled and nomadic. The new land tax was a modified kharaj, the latter originally representing a

fifth of the value of the harvest and paid to the khans. Now the agricultural population had to render only a tenth of the value of the harvest. This was levied on lands irrigated by rainfall.

The reduction of the tax by half was not in fact a very considerable concession, since its oppressiveness resulted not so much from its amount as from the methods of estimating and levying it. It was imposed not only on land actually under crops but also on that which lay fallow, so the natives who applied the three-field system paid for all three. Moreover, the amount of taxable land and the value of its crops were fixed without much reference to actual conditions. Neither the uyezd administration nor tax officials had facilities for measuring land and relied on information supplied by the heads of volosts and native tax collectors (serker).

The value of crops was estimated even more arbitrarily. Every autumn tax inspectors carried out a trial threshing of grain crops gathered from a small area and estimated its value according to the current market prices. The figure thus obtained was used to estimate the value of the harvest throughout Turkestan in spite of the fact that crop capacity differed from one area to another, particularly in the mountain regions.

In 1873 Kaufman drew up a new plan to modify the existing land tax. According to this, a total sum was to be fixed for each village community whose land would be surveyed by special officials. The average crop per desyatin (podesyatinnyy, 2.7 acres) was to be fixed on the basis of the previous year's data and its value calculated according to the average prices of agricultural produce. A tenth of this sum represented the amount of land tax due. The total sum due from the village community was to be apportioned by the village gathering (skhod) among its members according to the economic situation of each of them. This plan was not approved by the Ministry of Finance but Kaufman nevertheless introduced it into the Fergana oblast where it survived until 1886.

In order to strengthen the country's finances Kaufman and his staff devised various ways of increasing the land tax and they extended it to uncultivable (neudobnyye) and waste lands.

The new taxation system caused much discontent in the Fergana oblast and State Counsellor Girs, who in 1882 investigated Kaufman's administration, stated that all these measures were causing "general dissatisfaction among the subjugated (pokorennyy) population". He received numerous petitions in which the farming people of Fergana stated that they would rather pay a fifth of the income derived from their land as they had done under the Khanate of Kokand, than be subject

to the present system and pay one-tenth. (P.293)

Kaufman's system of "general apportionment" of the land tax worsened the situation of the majority of the agricultural population, for the real masters of the village gatherings were kulaks and usurers. The situation was so bad that the governor of Fergana in March 1882 directed the uyezd authorities to give protection to the peasants from the rich who were trying to transfer all taxation on to the poor. (P.293) There were cases of peasants who in despair abandoned their villages and settled elsewhere; for example, in 1881-2, 116 families from five villages of the Balykchinskaya volost of the Andizhan uyezd evaded taxation in this way.

Another grievance felt most acutely by the poor peasants was that the land tax was collected immediately after the harvest when they had no ready cash. They thus had to sell large amounts of their grain at the lowest prices to grain dealers, in order to obtain the required sum.

Another tax paid by the agricultural population was the zemstvo dues (?zemskiye sbory); they also had to perform various services such as the maintenance of irrigation works, bridges and roads, and the provision of troops with quarters and means of transport, etc. The zemstvo dues were spent on maintaining the local administration and were equal to 35 per cent of the land tax.

"One of the additional means of increasing the burden of taxation was the construction of new irrigation canals, which was allegedly [sic] inspired by the care of the Tsarist officials for the well-being of the native population." Thus in 1872, Kaufman started the construction of a canal in the Golodnaya Step' and some 70,000 peasants were recruited for the purpose. All the people of the oblast had to make a lump sum contribution based on the presumption that each labourer employed on construction would receive 60 kopecks a day. In fact he was paid only 5 kopecks and the money collected "was obviously stolen by contractors and officials". (P.294) In 1879 the work stopped and the disappointed natives began to call Kaufman's scheme a "pig-canal".

Tax collectors

Under the khan's rule taxes were farmed out in the majority of settlements. This system was largely retained by the Russians. Taxes were collected by serkers recruited from among the most prosperous elements of the native population. They in turn employed assistants who saw that the people did not conceal the real amount of their crops, and actually collected the taxes. All these officials were illegally maintained at the expense of the population. The usual amount of the

contribution made for this purpose by every tax-payer was the kepsen, corresponding to half a pud (8 kg.) of grain. The rake-off taken by the collectors, however, increased all along the line so that only half of all the sums gathered by the serker reached the Russian authorities. In 1871 an inquiry into the activities of tax gatherers in the Zeravshan okrug in 1870 was carried out and revealed that they had collected 165,000 rubles more in the land tax than they had paid into the treasury, and that the sum appropriated by them was higher than the officially fixed amount of the tax. (P.295)

The nomads

The main tax imposed by the Russians on the nomads and semi-nomads in the steppe regions was the so-called kibitka tax which in 1865 amounted to 1 ruble 50 kopecks. It continually increased so that by 1882 it had reached 4 rubles. The kibitka was a very unsatisfactory basis on which to calculate the tax and the Ministry of Finance admitted that it could include both "a rich nomad household owning hundreds of various animals, and a poor kapa, a reed hut, the sorry dwelling of a man who somehow manages to get a wretched living by cultivating a field of 1-2 desyatins [2.7 acres], the irrigation of which, let alone other work, involves hard and barely endurable labour." (P.295)

For taxation purposes, the kibitka had a very vague meaning. Nomads in the course of settling down paid tax on each yurt (sic) or individual household, while the estimated number of kibitkas (sic) served only to fix the total sum of the kibitka tax due from a volost and aul (nomad village). In many cases the officials could not estimate correctly the number of taxable kibitkas. According to an official definition the kibitka had three characteristics: dwelling, household and the family using it (zhilye, khozyaystvo, sem'ya), while in many cases one of these factors, usually the first, did not exist or was hard to identify.

The payments imposed on the nomads were the so-called zemstvo and communal (obshchestvennyye) dues for the maintenance of the aul elders and native (tuzemnyy) administration, as well as other payments in cash estimated on the same principle as the basic tax. The total sum of these taxes kept increasing: in 1869 it was 75 kopecks per kibitka and in 1882, 3 rubles. Thus in the early 1880s each Kirgiz kibitka paid:

Kibitka tax	4	rubles
zemstvo dues	1.25	"
communal dues	1.25	"
contribution for schools	0.50	"
Total	7	rubles (P.296)

The assessment of all these taxes was subject to much abuse from which mainly the poor suffered. Thus in 1865 Kirgiz nomads had to pay 5, 6 or even 10 silver rubles per kibitka instead of the official 1,5 rubles. All the money above the last sum was appropriated by the native tax collectors. (P.296)

The rich Kirgiz concealed a large part of their herds and flocks from the tax inspector while the poor had no such facilities. Another grievance of the poor was that the kibitka tax was gathered in autumn when prices of cattle were very low. Thus in the early 1890s at the markets of the Aulie-Ata (now Dzhambul) uyezd a sheep cost 1,25-2 rubles in autumn and 5-6 rubles in spring. Moreover, to pay the tax the poorer people often had to borrow from usurers at an interest of 50 or 100 per cent, or even more.

The assessment of taxes due from the aul was done by the heads of volosts, while the aul elders apportioned the total sums among their people. Both the volost heads and the elders were paid by the Government and they were elected, at least officially, by the local population. They were recruited from among the bays, and both their electors and the Tsarist officials supervising the elections were usually bribed. In 1898 the Governor of the Andizhan uyezd, Lieutenant-Colonel Koishevskiy, wrote that the lower administrative officials "can only secure their posts by bribing the electors. The only difference is that the volost heads have to pay much more than the judges and village elders. But the duties of the first are wider and more varied, so that they have more opportunity to enrich themselves. The price of being elected a volost headman can be as much as 7,000 rubles". (P.297) As Koishevskiy points out, the fact that headmen were ready to pay so much for election shows clearly how much the post was valued as a source of illegal income. Their salaries from zemstvo funds only amounted to 1,000 rubles a year, but they were able to recover their election expenses by imposing an increased kibitka tax.

Various services were particularly obnoxious to the nomads, scattered as they were over large areas. For instance, in order to carry out their dorozhnaya povinnost' (work on road maintenance) they had to travel long distances. The result was that in the majority of cases they tried to have their services commuted to money payments, which was exploited in the usual way by officialdom: the Kirgiz complained that the aul elders demanded in lieu of the road service, sums two or three times larger than what they handed over to the tax inspectors. Thus each kibitka had to pay 1-2,50 rubles while the official sum was 45-80 kopecks. (Pp.297-8)

Other taxes

In one respect the Central Asians were more privileged as regards taxes than the population of Russia proper, for in the 1870-80s they did not pay indirect taxes. The local tobacco and salt industries were not subject to excise duties. The drink duty mainly concerned the Russian population since the natives hardly used alcohol at all.

After the coming of the Russians taxes paid by the clergy and merchants were reduced. The former were granted total exemption from taxes and services, and the latter had them considerably reduced in 1875. In the early years after the conquest the zyaket (from the Arabic zakat) tax existing under the khans was kept in force. It was equal to 2.5 per cent a year of all the capital declared by the merchants. Although not particularly oppressive, this tax was higher than taxes paid by merchants in Russia. In 1872 at the Central Asian merchants' request a special commission was set up to investigate their proposal that the zyaket should be replaced by the Russian system of merchant taxes. In 1875 this measure was in fact introduced and the Central Asian merchants considerably profited by it since it drastically reduced the sums hitherto paid by them. In any case, they constituted only a small part of profits derived from the country: between 1868-79 they amounted to 3,400,000 rubles, or 11 per cent of the total, while at the same time the land and kibitka taxes yielded 61 per cent. (P.298)

Expenditure

Government expenditure in Central Asia revealed "particularly clearly the parasitic character" of Tsarism (p.299) since almost all the money obtained from the population was spent on the army and police and very little remained for education, health services etc.

"Plundering national funds by Tsarist officialdom and native administration was nowhere so open and shameless as in Central Asia. Here are some examples: during the same twelve years [1868-79] some 75,000,000 rubles, or about 75 per cent of all expenditure, went on maintaining 50,000 troops. The remaining 25,000,000 rubles went to maintain the bureaucratic administration, jails, police and law courts. In the same period 300,000 rubles were spent on education - less than one kopeck per head of population a year. It should be added that during a few years following the conquest (1868-75) not a single kopeck went on education and the 300,000 rubles mentioned above were spent mainly on two grammar and two progimnaziyas (incomplete grammar schools) attended by children of Russian officials. Nothing was spent on educating the natives." (P.298) In 1873 Kaufman drew up a plan of founding

mixed schools which would serve to Russify the natives, but the Ministry of Finance considered this "premature". Only in 1875 did Kaufman succeed in setting up such schools, but they were financed from extra funds levied from the population in addition to the ordinary taxes.

The health services were in an even worse state. In 1882 in the whole of Turkestan there were only 18 uyezd and town doctors and 37 lower medical functionaries. Thus there was one doctor per 170,000 inhabitants. (P.298) There were almost no dispensaries and hospitals, and almost all the medical staff mentioned above lived in Tashkent so that the natives were left without any health services at all. In 1882, 107,000 rubles, or about three kopecks per person, were spent on medical services. (P.298)

This was how the tax-payers' money was used: as for sums derived from the communal and zemstvo dues which were at the disposal of local administration, they were as a rule plundered by the officials themselves. Thus in 1882 it was discovered that these sums were wither simply stolen or spent on various forms of entertainment. In 1875, 17,000 rubles derived from the zemstvo dues were distributed as loans to local officials, 4,100 rubles were spent on furniture for three uyezd governors and 8,000 on the triumphal welcome of Kaufman on his return from an expedition against Kokand rebels, and on other pointless activities. (P.300)

It was officially believed that Turkestan was "unprofitable" (ubytochnyy), Kaufman's account showed that during twelve years its expenditure was 99,000,000 rubles and income only 32,000,000. Thus the deficit reached 67,000,000 rubles or over 5,500,000 a year. (P.300) This, however, did not take into account the fact that the Turkestan budget was made to provide for some of the responsibilities of the State treasury, such as, above all, the maintenance of the troops, which should have been undertaken by the Ministry of War, as elsewhere in the Russian Empire. In fact in Turkestan revenue somewhat exceeded expenditure.

"The official theory that Turkestan was unprofitable was extremely useful and convenient for the Tsarist bureaucracy for, on the one hand, it justified the anti-national, totally oppressive taxation imposed on the conquered lands and, on the otherhand, it excused the negligible expenditure on social, cultural and other needs of the country." (P.300)

D O M E S T I C H O U S I N G

In 1956 CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW published an article on domestic housing in Central Asia (No. 2, pp. 130-6). The following article shows the housing position as it is today. In general the situation appears to be unchanged: the same complaints, the same shortages and shortcomings. There is one significant change, however, that whereas in 1956 the official minimum planned standard of living space per person was given as 9 sq. metres (97 sq. feet) (see CAR, 1956, No.2, p.132), it is now given as 6 sq. metres (65 sq. feet) per person (PV. 2.8.60). The fact that, among other examples, a flat of only 45 sq. metres (484 sq. feet) is considered large (p.365 below), and a three-room flat of 62 sq. metres (667 sq. feet) is too large for a family of four (p.367 below), shows that this very low standard is indeed regarded as adequate.

It is also interesting to compare the present standard with the living quarters at the "Spassky Zavod" copper works operated under a British concession up to 1919 at Uspenskiy near Karaganda. Here the regulations stipulated that every person of 12 and over should have 510 cubic feet of air space (approx. 65 sq. feet x 7.5 feet) and every child under 12, 170 cubic feet.

. . .

I. Introduction - II. Urban Housing - III. The Countryside

I. Introduction

The bulk of living accommodation in the towns and industrial settlements of the Soviet Union is owned by the State, but a large part of it is managed by the local soviets. Another part is administered by individual factories and establishments who let flats and rooms to their own employees. Some town and suburban (dacha) houses are owned by cooperatives; it is not clear whether these are tenants' or consumers' cooperatives. Finally, some small houses are private property. (For regulations governing the citizen's right to own private property see CAR, 1956, No.2, pp.131-2.)

The situation in the countryside is somewhat obscure. Privately owned houses constitute a much higher proportion than in the towns, but much building is also undertaken by the State.

Housing plans

In spite of extensive building, there is still a housing shortage in the towns. It is further aggravated by the failure to carry out construction plans and by the poor quality of a very large proportion of buildings completed. These two points are a universal complaint almost irrespective of the republic and town concerned. Thus in 1959 in Kirgizia the building of 157,000 sq. metres of living space was undertaken at State expense. Between 1957-9, 60,000 sq. metres were not ready for occupation on time. In 1959 and the first nine months of 1960, 101,000 sq. metres or 4,000 flats remained uncompleted and between January-October 1960 the building plan was carried out in Frunze by only 51 per cent, in the Osh oblast by 41 per cent, and by only seven per cent in the Tyan'-Shan' oblast. (SK. 23.10.60) On the whole, by October 1960 the annual plan for domestic housing was carried out by only 37 per cent. (SK. 2.11.60)

In Azerbaydzhan in 1959, 8,000 flats were built, but Alikhanov, Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan Central Committee, said that in that year "tens of thousands of square metres of living space, a number of new schools, hospitals and children's pre-school institutions remained unfinished." (BR. 12.7.60) In the same year in Tadzhikistan water supply systems were constructed or improved in 10 towns and rayon centres, and over 3,000 flats received gas. (KT. 5.5.60) In 1958-9, 21,000 flats were completed in the towns and workers' settlements, 19,000 new houses in the country, and 12 water supply systems were put into operation. But "the sanitary condition in the majority of the towns, settlements and villages of the republic is unsatisfactory. Refuse collection and cleaning are irregular in inhabited places. This encourages flies, dust and dirt, and results in increased frequency of infectious diseases in the hot season." (KT. 9.7.60)

During the past three years 16,500,000 sq. metres of living accommodation have been completed in Kazakhstan, of which 8,600,000 metres were built at State expense. But plans are not fully carried out and there are few building trusts as efficient as the Sokolovrud-stroy, which in five years built the town of Rudnyy, now inhabited by 50,000 people. In the republic as a whole in 1959 the plan was fulfilled by 87 per cent; during the first five months of 1960 the Kustanay oblast alone completed the plan. By 1 June 1960 only 14 per cent of the year's plan had been carried out in the republic while in some oblasts the situation was quite desperate: in the Akmolinsk,

Kokchetav, North-Kazakhstan and some other oblasts it was only nine per cent. House building in the sovkhozes was even worse: in the Semipalatinsk oblast 24,700 sq. metres were to be completed by June 1960, but the actual figure was 225 sq. metres or about one per cent; in the Kokchetav, Kustanay, East-Kazakhstan and Aktyubinsk oblasts the percentage varied between 4.3-7. (KP. 18.6.60) The result of all this was that during the first nine months of the year the republican population received 860,000 sq. metres less than planned. (KP. 26.10.60)

In Turkmenistan 446,600 sq. metres were completed in 1958-9, of these 123,500 were in Ashkhabad (TI. 27.8.60), while in the kolkhozes 6,217 houses were built in 1959. (TI. 24.6.60)

Uzbekistan seems to be exceptional so far as building plans are concerned. There it has been definitely stated that during the first eleven months of 1960 the Ministry of Building (other authorities are not mentioned) carried out the quota by 101.5 per cent and 50,000 sq. metres more than in 1959 were completed. (PV. 24.12.60)

II. Urban Housing

Town planning

Town planning is much talked about. Instead of streets, modern towns should be built by mikrorayons - self-contained districts with shops, schools, kindergartens, cinemas etc. This planning method is at present being applied in Moscow and is much praised for its practicability. In Azerbaydzhan, the new town of Sumgait is now being developed on these lines (BR. 21.7.60) and the south-eastern suburb of Frunze is to be developed on the same principle. In the latter, the whole area will have 450,000 sq. metres of domestic accommodation in three- and four-storey houses. The suburb will be divided into mikrorayons of about 25 hectares each with a public garden and sports grounds in the centre. (SK. 29.7.60)

The building industry

The frequent failure to complete building plans is due to a variety of reasons. One of them is without doubt the inadequacy of wages in the building industry, although this is not officially given as a reason for inefficiency. It appears that the wages have increased at a smaller rate than the productivity of labour: 10.9 and 14.9 per cent respectively. (SK. 24.11.60)

BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY seeks the explanation, among other things, in poor labour discipline, bad organization of socialist competition, the fulfilment of socialist obligations not being controlled and the fact that "in many building organizations criticism and self-criticism are poorly developed". (12.7.60) More substantial and common complaints are that mechanization of building processes is still poor, many people employed in managerial posts are unqualified and now and again there is a shortage of various building materials.

Buildings are completed very slowly; for example, in Pavlodar, Kokchetav, Alma-Ata and elsewhere those started in 1956 are still unfinished. This is because building firms start too many houses at the same time - thus the Aktyubstroy has 130 buildings under construction. (KP. 26.10.60) Alma-Ata supplies a good example of this diffusion of funds, labour and building materials. Funds allotted to the city by the State for domestic buildings increase every year while living space completed decreases, thus:

Year	1958	1959	1960
funds allotted (in million rubles)	187.8	233.9	258.2
work completed (in sq. metres)	149.200	150.7	130.000

During these years 130,000 sq. metres remained unfinished and there are several reasons for this: houses in the city are being built by some dozens of big and small concerns which results in a diffusion of labour, material resources and transport facilities. There is a large number of buildings awaiting completion: on 1 January 1961 there were some 200,000 sq. metres waiting to be finished. Although the source does not openly say so, the explanation of this must obviously be sought in the fact that the efficiency of building organizations is judged not only by the number of square metres completed, but also by the amount of allotted money spent. Thus the firms strive to spend the sums at their disposal and this is done in the following way: more labour is expended on finishing than on erecting a carcass, although finishing represents only 8-10 per cent of the total cost of a building. In consequence the firms hastily erect carcasses for which they receive from the banks 90 per cent of the sum allotted. They then proceed to construct more carcasses postponing the completion of the existing ones indefinitely. Such a procedure makes the work of painters and other finishers so difficult that they abandon their work and learn new skills. This leads to a shortage of experienced finishers, with deplorable results to be discussed below. There is little use of machinery, many difficult operations being carried out by hand while the machines stand idle.

Difficult living and working conditions caused 2,500 workers to leave the Almaatazhilstroy trust during a single year. In 1960 alone bad quality work and its diffusion inflicted a loss of 50,000,000 rubles on the various concerns working for the Alma-Ata sovnarkhoz. (KP. 29.1.61)

The solution of the housing problem is being sought in the nationalization of the building industry. The great majority of houses are still built of bricks, laid by hand, though buildings made of prefabricated blocks and panels are not only much quicker to erect but also 20-30 per cent cheaper. "House-building factories" are being set up in all the republics, but their benefit is not yet felt since, as in the rest of the building industry, they suffer from the failure to fulfil quotas. Thus in Kazakhstan none of the eight factories which received full equipment in 1959 was working in 1960; while those which received their equipment in 1960 have not yet even been started. (KP. 26.10.60) Similar complaints occur elsewhere.

The situation in Ashkhabad is particularly difficult since it was severely damaged by an earthquake in 1948. Since then 791,200 sq. metres of living space have been put up, but a large part of the population still lives in vremyankas (temporary huts), many of these being unfit for habitation. Another 620,000 sq. metres are required before the huts can vanish, but in 1960 the plan was carried out by only 86.8 per cent and over 27,000,000 rubles were not used. (TI. 31.3.61)

Baku alone reports good progress: in 1956, 2,228 flats were completed, 3,784 in 1957, 5,290 in 1958, 5,970 in 1959 and in 1960 the expected figure was 7,443. (BR. 14.8.60)

Quality of building

"There is a funny word pokazukha [eye-wash]. It would be useless to search for it in dictionaries of the Russian language; it just is not there. No, maybe because it is used by only a limited group of people and even then it is uttered in a whisper, with a cautious look round. . . The heroes of pokazukha are people who try to present things in a better light than they in fact are. The main concern of these pokazukha heroes is to make reports and baffle with statistics. . ."

These "heroes" are people responsible for building domestic housing, who in fact struggle desperately to fulfil the quotas. The Grazhdanstroy trust of Stalinabad is full of them. It has built a block of 61 flats in the city centre. In some of the flats lavatories lack the most essential equipment and the roof leaks. In one flat a fountain gushes out of a water-pipe, there is no electricity and the bath does not empty.

Wall-plastering warps, floor paint sticks to the soles and during rain rooms are flooded through the balcony doors. It is impossible to enter W.Cs for the doors get stuck against the bowls (if there are any). Similar houses are being built at Gissar. (KT. 11.8.60)

The following is a typical example of a block of flats, many similar cases can be found in any republic: "If for some scientific and research purpose a specimen house with unfinished and faulty fittings were required, it would not be necessary to build one specially for that purpose. It is enough to enter any block of flats in the Ak-Tepe district [of Tashkent]. Visitors could find there much instructive material. The guide would slowly conduct them from one entrance to another and, glancing at a register of errors, he would explain 'this, as you can see, is ventilation which does not ventilate. Take care not to touch the walls - they are crumbling down. This, here, is an unusual construction of a water tap which has been placed not over the sink but beside it. And here you see doors which do not close and windows which do not open. All this unique structure is covered by a roof which cannot help leaking. Here, open this umbrella - someone having a shower bath on the third floor. No, this is not a workshop but a built-in wardrobe. The floors are of the woe-to-the-new-tenant type. Steady, don't break your legs - this is the yard with a flower garden and children's playground.' Such an excursion, of course, is but fantasy, but the rest of it is alas! true: there exists a six-page register of errors." In other parts of Tashkent there are similar buildings. (PV. 15.10.60) An official of the No.23 house management says that his office receives 30-40 letters of complaint daily from its householders. (PV. 23.11.60)

Similar examples are supplied by all the republican papers. Such flats are frequently let to people who move in and then engage in an endless and hopeless struggle with the authorities to have the necessary repairs carried out.

In 1959 in Kazakhstan of the 5,065 houses completed only 11 (sic) upon examination were found perfect, about a third good and two-thirds just satisfactory. (KP. 18.6.60) Apparently, the uninhabitable structures are classified as "satisfactory". In Uzbekistan in 1959 of 1,055 houses completed only 11 were perfect, 347 good and the "unsatisfactory" remainder had various defects. A house may lack water-pipes, drainage and electricity but people are allowed to move in - a practice particularly common in Bukhara and Samarkand. (PV. 16.4.60) In Alma-Ata only 42 out of 367 blocks of flats received by a Government commission were found good, and repairs increased the cost of a square metre of living space from 1,350 to 1,780 rubles. (KP. 29.1.61)

Tenants

If the authorities build shoddy houses, many tenants help to make them still worse. SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA of 14.4.60 deplores the attitude of many people towards State property, as exemplified by the situation in many new buildings in the housing estate in the southern suburb of Frunze. A few months after a block of 24 flats in Nova-Beninskaya Street had been let to people, the walls in the passages looked as if they had been deliberately splashed with dirty water, holes had been pierced in them and they were covered with drawings and scribbling wherever the human hand could reach. In one doorway someone had turned on the tap of the central heating system and the water was damaging the wall, a circumstance which the inhabitants watched with indifference. In the basement they chopped firewood and the floors, doorsteps and stairs had been ripped up. In a recently inhabited house in Zavodskaya Street, the windows are already smashed, the walls scratched and the wallpaper hangs in ribbons; some tenants are already clamouring for re-decoration. In a new flat in Toktogul Street the occupier slaughters sheep and puts refuse into the drainage system. A three-year old house in Belinskiy Street, occupied by lecturers of the State University, looks as if it had been in use for at least ten years. Dirty staircase windows do not let in the light and on the landing outside the six flats occupied by these learned gentlemen lies a heap of refuse. There are more such houses, and their inhabitants could not care less, for the municipal housing office is responsible for their maintenance.

Living space and rents

Living conditions are improving now that the authorities seem to have realized that each family should have a separate flat. In Uzbekistan until 1956 big (sic) flats of some 45 sq. metres were commonly built, each to be shared by two or three families. Now it is believed that "it is necessary to build more one- and two-roomed flats instead of putting two or sometimes even more families in one three-roomed flat". The minimum area per person should be 6 sq. metres (PV. 2.8.60), this apparently to include the kitchen, hall and bathroom.

Rents were reassessed when the new ruble was introduced. In Azerbaydzhan in the towns and working settlements one square metre of dwelling space, formerly estimated at 30-44 kopecks per month now costs 3-4.4 kopecks. Those who earn over 14 rubles 50 kopecks per month pay an extra 0.33 kopecks per square metre per ruble earned above that sum. The total maximum rent does not exceed 13.2 kopecks per square metre per month. (BR. 28.10.60) Thus rents are low. But the housing shortage allows private house owners to derive a good income from letting rooms: in Gur'yev a room costs 150-200 [old] rubles a month. (KP. 27.2.60)

The builders built it.....but the tenants have given it character

This is what our house looked like before the gas pipe was repaired

This is what it looked like afterwards

One-year old flats in Stalinabad: Everything ready for putting in gas but no authority for the men to start work.

The mechanization of building

Reproduced from Central Asian newspapers, 1960-1

Services

Central heating is paid for separately whether it is satisfactory or not, and there are numerous complaints that in many blocks of flats it gives no heat. The charges are not light: in Frunze the tenants of a block of 42 flats paid (in old rubles) 50-60 rubles per month for a one-roomed flat, 80-100 rubles for two rooms and for a flat of 36 sq. metres 1,080 rubles a year. (SK. 2.12.60) These payments are not uniform: in Stalinabad in some houses the charge is (apparently in new rubles) 8.40 rubles per square metre a year, and in some others 12 rubles. The difference is even more pronounced in houses with hot water: in one block of flats 14.40 rubles and in another 27 rubles per square metre a year. (KT. 22.12.60)

Gas is still regarded as a luxury. In Ordzhonikidzeabad in October 1960 there were 34 gas cookers using bottled gas. (KT. 16.10.60) By the end of the year 8,000 households in the republic had gas (KT. 31.1.61), the majority of these in Stalinabad where gasification has started on a big scale, and by February 1961 over 7,000 flats had gas. (KT. 4.2.61) The process is hindered by a shortage of the necessary equipment. (KT. 30.3.60)

In Turkmenistan, Ashkhabad was the first to enjoy this luxury; Krasnovodosk, Mary, Chardzhou and some others coming next. In 1960, 5,664 new gas cookers were installed in the republic. (TI. 18.11.60)

Tashkent still uses bottled gas, but in a few years' time it will go over to natural gas piped from Bukhara. (PV. 29.12.60)

Some towns are still short of water. In Baku it is due to the growth of the population and the extension of the urban area. A plan for its supply has been drawn up: at fixed hours it will be available in outlying districts which will get it once or twice a day; most of the town will enjoy it all day. Those who have baths in their flats pay two (probably old) rubles per person a month, those with individual water supply but no bath, pay 1.5 rubles and people sharing communal taps one ruble. (BR. 14.8.60)

In some places the situation is worse. At dawn the streets of Kulyab are full of people with buckets searching for water and wandering from one street tap to another. It takes at least an hour to get enough water for a day. During the last 20 years the population has increased by 10,000 but the town water supply system has not been extended. There is not a single public water tap in the airport region inhabited by thousands of people, and none in some other areas. (KT. 29.6.60)

In Ashkhabad there was a shortage of water in the summer of 1960. There was never sufficient pressure for it to reach the second and third floors and some parts of the city had it only occasionally. The inhabitants had to fetch it from distant places, and yet they had to pay regularly for water not only for human consumption but also for gardening. (TI. 14.6.60)

Allocation of accommodation

Housing shortage leads to various abuses. In Stalinabad flats are allotted by a special commission of the city executive committee. Buildings belonging to enterprises and organizations are let by their managements, and important workers have priority. But "orders" to move in, whether to the enterprises' or other flats, are issued by the executive committee. Such an "order" legally entitled the holder to occupy the flat. Nevertheless, there are cases of people moving in of their own accord and the managements of their places of work support them. This often happens before the house concerned has been properly finished. Some people move into flats allotted to others. Legally, the prosecutor authorizes the eviction of such offenders, but in many cases the executive committees of the local soviets delay carrying out the prosecutor's order. Even those responsible for maintaining order set a bad example; for instance, a police lieutenant of Khodzhent who forcibly opened a flat given to someone else and moved in. (KT. 9.12.60)

In Baku there is not sufficient control over the allotment of living quarters. Many local notables occupying comfortable houses are given still better ones. In May 1959 the Party and soviet authorities decided to rehouse by April 1960 all those living in basements, and in a short time hundreds of people were given good flats. But soon the city executive committee began to interfere and allot to its members flats which had already been given to others, who had priority on the waiting list. In this manner the inspector of the finance department of the Baku soviet with a family of five received a three-room flat intended for eight (sic) persons. Enterprises and organizations, which themselves build houses for their personnel, are guilty of similar practices, for example, the Montin saw-mill gave the head of No.4 building office a three-room flat of 62 sq. metres, though there are only four people in his family. (BR. 8.3.60) Of the 24 employees of the Petroleum Chemical Processes Institute who were given flats in a new house, 19 hold managerial posts although the old quarters of some of them were quite satisfactory, while some humbler personnel of the Institute badly need living accommodation. (BR. 25.10.60)

Private houses

With the existing housing shortage the authorities might be expected to encourage town dwellers to build their own houses as they are legally entitled to do. This, however, seems to be a risky undertaking since such people may find their names in the papers with questions about how they obtained money for building, and hints that it came from a doubtful source. PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 26.2.61 ridiculed some such people residing at Chirchik. One man with only a wife and one daughter had built a four room house of 100 sq. metres. Such a house was too large for them and how could they afford it anyway. Another man, a public prosecutor had built a house of five or six rooms, though he had only a wife, and so did not need so much space. The paper comments, "We wish we could defend the name of a Soviet prosecutor against such attacks [questions about money] but we cannot. Indeed, it makes you wonder where it comes from?" Some dozens of such houses appeared in the town in 1960, so the paper goes on wondering.

III. The Countryside

Information about housing in the country is scarce. There are mentions of villages where native clay huts are being or have been replaced with comfortable houses lit by the "little lamps of Il'ich" (electricity), but very few facts are given. It seems clear that the percentage of house owners is much higher in villages than in towns, houses being often built with kolkhoz help. Two subjects repeatedly referred to in connexion with living conditions in the countryside are those of planning and "agrotowns" (agrogorod).

Planning

"General planning helps kolkhoz villages and auls to change to urban ways, which is a wonderful feature of Communism." The Inter-kolkhoz Planning Organization of Taldy-Kurgan helps kolkhozes in this. It was founded in 1959 by the neighbouring kolkhozes as its shareholders. In its first year it carried out planning work worth over one million rubles and the kolkhozes received twelve plans for their central settlements. One of them has been adopted by the First of May kolkhoz in the Karatal'skiy rayon. Its streets are straight and wide; offices, shops and cultural establishments are in the centre of the village. A club is being built and there is also to be a hotel and department store. The kolkhoz boulevard runs along the river Karatal. Clay huts have given place to two- and three-room houses with verandahs. (KP. 7.6.60)

Such planning is very important since in expanding kolkhozes the centres should be easily accessible from all the outlying parts. It is even more important where there are a number of kolkhozes situated in the same district each trying to be self-contained, which causes much unnecessary work and expense. This situation is common in Azerbaydzhan. "The existing way of planning and building in the rural districts of the republic clashes with the requirements of the organized distribution, growth and development of settlements. It is still determined by the narrow interests of the enterprises concerned which makes building much costlier and sometimes even disorganizes it. According to localist (mestnichesky) tendencies hundreds of small villages, machine and tractor stations, various agricultural produce processing establishments, builders' settlements and others lie outside districts served by schools, hospitals, clubs, sports grounds, children's institutions and public transport." Many rayon centres have developed into towns, but the majority of them lie outside the area of expanding industry and preserve their rustic appearance. At the same time well-appointed kolkhoz settlements have grown up near towns and villages. Thus Shamkhor rayon centre lies in the territory of three kolkhozes and the kolkhozniks form the bulk of its population. One of these, the K. Tsetkin kolkhoz, has various trade, communal and recreational establishments including the fine town park. They constitute its central settlement situated outside the town. Thus the kolkhoz is breaking away from the town and developing into a separate self-contained settlement. The other two local kolkhozes show the same tendency, with the result that an area of a couple of square kilometres will eventually have three sport stadiums, three houses of culture etc. apart from the town ones, and the population will increasingly gravitate towards its own kolkhoz centres with their own services and facilities. The same is going on in the town of Geokchay inhabited by people of five kolkhozes, Akhsu with two kolkhozes, and others.

Other rayon centres like Barda, Khachmas and Sabirabad are expanding chaotically for they do not observe their general plans, while thirty-seven other towns have no plans at all. (BR. 16.8.60)

Agrotowns*

"To move towards Communism means to bring the socialist village closer to the town." (BR. 21.7.60) This means that villages should assume the appearance of towns and enjoy town amenities. The movement has the greatest possibilities in the virgin lands of Kazakhstan where new settlements are being built. In the old Akmolinsk oblast (now part

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* An article on the agrotowns appeared in CAR, 1957, No.1.

of the Tselinnyy Kray) many new villages look like small towns. The Dvurechnyy, Svobodnyy, Kalininskiy, Gastello and other sovkhozes have such agrotowns. In the other northern oblasts of the republic they are also quite numerous. (KP. 3.12.60)

The Kiyevskiy sovkhoz, Karaganda oblast, is six years old. Instead of traditional cottages it has blocks of centrally heated flats which are cheaper to build, heat and maintain than individual houses. There is a school, hospital, kindergarten, canteen etc. Though agrotowns are much talked about, there are still no schemes for building them (apart from the northern oblasts), since planning organizations have so far failed to supply the plans. (KP. 15.12.60)

New "free" health resort for Tselinny Kray workers

The construction of a health resort for workers in the Tselinny Kray will begin next year on the shores of Lake Shchuch'ye in the Kokchetav oblast. The lake is an ideal place for a resort, surrounded as it is by low, wooded hills. The resort will be one of the first of a new type in the Soviet Union, where people can go freely without a pass and stay with their families as long as they like. The construction of the whole town is to be completed by 1965, but it will be ready to receive its first guests in 1963. PROSTOR, 1961, No.8

International health seminar in Uzbekistan

An international seminar on health education was held in Uzbekistan during the summer of 1961. The seminar was attended by doctors from all parts of the world - Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, the UAR, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Turkey and Poland. SU, 1961, No.138

TELEVISION AND RADIO*

I. Aims, Organization and Development - II. Technical Problems - III. Programme Organization - IV. Programme Content.

I. Aims, Organization and Development

"The main task of Soviet sound and television broadcasting is to mobilize the workers of our country in order to translate successfully into reality the Seven-Year Plan and the whole programme of the large scale construction of Communism in the USSR." (TI. 7.5.61) Of these, television receives more attention from the press because it is still largely a novelty.

Television

Definite dates when television transmissions could first be received in Central Asia are not available, but a television service of a sort was available to parts of the area by 1955 with transmissions relayed from Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. By the end of 1956 the Azerbaydzhan television centre at Baku was also serving parts of Turkmenistan. (TI. 23.12.56) The first centre to operate from Central Asia itself was the Tashkent television centre which was opened in 1956. (PV. 6.10.56) The first centre in Kazakhstan was opened in Ust'-Kamenogorsk early in 1958 (KP. 16.3.58), and the Alma-Ata centre, the building of which started in 1956, was also due to begin transmitting in 1958 (KP. 20.5.55). A station in Karaganda was due to open in 1957 (KP. 20.10.55), the Frunze centre was begun in 1956 (SK. 22.11.56), and the Stalinabad station began transmitting in 1959. (KT. 5.11.59)

"Together with the press and radio, television is a powerful method of Communist education of the masses, of forming public opinion, spreading information as well as political and scientific knowledge".

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* The reader is also referred to the articles "Broadcast Services" and "Communications and Broadcasting" (CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1954, No.2) and "Broadcasting and Relay Services" (Ibid., No.4). These articles deal mainly with the technical side of sound broadcasting.

A great asset of television is that it "serves also that part of the population which is generally left outside the system of political education and seldom attends public talks and lectures. Active television viewers are housewives, old age pensioners and elderly people." The great propaganda value of television is borne out by the fact that a film shown by Alma-Ata television is seen by more people than would see it if it were shown seven times a day for seven days in all the city clubs and cinemas. It enjoys great popularity and the people fondly call their television sets a "home theatre, family concert hall, home sports stadium and lecture hall." (KP. 1.4.61)

In spite of its fairly recent origin, the use of television is becoming widespread in Central Asia. In March 1960, 25,000 television sets were being used in Alma-Ata alone. (KP. 3.3.60) In some 100 inhabited places round Aktyubinsk 3,000 families have them. (KP. 27.11.60) In Kirgizia some 10,000 sets were in use in June 1960 in spite of the fact that the Frunze television centre did not start work until a year and a half before that date. In the following September 12,000 sets were in use. (SK. 4.6.60, 9.9.60) In May 1961, there were 18,000 private sets in Kirgizia. (SK. 7.5.61) Four days later, however, only some 15,000 families were stated to have television sets. (SK. 11.5.61) Between 1953-9 some 90,000 sets were sold in Uzbekistan and seven persons out of every 10 (sic) living there are able to watch television. (PV. 7.5.60, 3.12.60) In Tadzhikistan over 5,000 sets were in use in May 1960. Eight months later 100,000 people could watch the programmes. (KT. 14.5.56, 11.2.61) About 70,000 Baku people have television sets (apparently a number of people sharing a set). (BR. 3.1.61)

Radio

It will be some time before television is able to compete with radio. In Kazakhstan there are 3,000 radio rediffusion points, some 970,000 rediffusion (i.e. earphone and loudspeaker extensions), and over 500,000 receiving sets. (KP. 1.4.61) In Kirgizia over 250 relay stations, 200,000 radio rediffusion points and 82,000 wireless sets are in use. In the last 10 years the number of rediffusion points has increased six times, the radius of the radio network seven times and the capacity of the rediffusion stations four times. (SK. 7.5.61)

The broadcasting authorities try to cater for all the nationalities in their republics. The Kazakh radio broadcasts not only in Kazakh and Russian, but also in Uzbek, Uygur, German, Korean and Chechen (KP. 1.4.61), and in Kirgizia in Kirgiz, Russian, Dungan and German. (SK. 7.5.60) In Uzbekistan bilingual television will soon become general: the Uzbeks and Russians will be able to watch the same programme, though each group in its own language. The language will

change at the turn of the knob. The method has been invented by two graduate radio operation students, Vishnevskiy and Paltapandi, and the Ministry of Communications is to organize in 1961 mass production of these devices which can be fitted to ordinary television sets. This method, very useful in the national republics, will greatly simplify the work of the television broadcasting authorities since the same programme will serve both groups. (PV. 4.12.60)

The making and use of wireless sets without a licence involves severe punishment in the form of "measures of communal correction by the collectives of employees at the [offenders'] place of work, study or residence, as well as by the comrade courts." Should this fail, they are liable, in Kazakhstan, to a fine of 200-1,000 (old) rubles imposed by the people's court and to confiscation of the offending set. (KP. 19.4.60) In Azerbaydzhan they also risk the "measures of communal correction" or a fine of 500 rubles which increases threefold should the offence recur. (BR. 20.4.60) Similar orders were issued in 1960 in Turkmenistan (TI. 7.6.60) and Uzbekistan (PV. 8.4.60).

II. Technical Problems

Radio

There is much still to be done to increase the coverage of Kazakh radio. Its capacity is too weak to ensure good reception of republican broadcasts in the more remote parts of the country. The Ministry of Communications should hasten the construction of new radio stations and increase the capacity of the existing ones. Some oblast towns - Kokchetav, Pavlodar, Ust'-Kamenogorsk etc. - still have no transmitting stations. The republican radio has a single programme and another programme cannot be started because of the lack of "technical basis". Its broadcasts on ultra-short waves are heard only within 80-100 kilometres of Alma-Ata. The work of rediffusion stations should also be improved: the majority of them belong to kolkhozes, sovkhozes and organizations, and many of them have no fixed plan of work and they do not relay central and republican broadcasts. (KP. 23.3.60)

Two months later the same source provided a completely different picture of the situation: during the last few years the "technical basis" of Kazakh radio had grown threefold and Alma-Ata broadcasts could be heard all over the republic. New transmitting stations started work in nine oblast centres, which had greatly facilitated the work of oblast broadcasting organizations. Broadcasting from Alma-Ata on ultra short waves, which started at the end of 1959, was a great success and two programmes were broadcast on them. Radio facilities were best in

the North-Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata and Dzhambul oblasts where all the kolkhoz central settlements could use them. They had been extended also to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes in 40 other rayons. In 1958-60, however, the plan of installing earphone sets and loudspeakers in country places had not been fulfilled, particularly in the Akmolinsk and South-Kazakhstan oblasts. (KP. 7.5.60)

In Kirgizia the power of rediffusion stations has quadrupled in the last 10 years and the radius of the network has grown seven times. In the second half of 1960 the republican radio started a second programme and by 1965 all the inhabited points in the country will be linked up with the network. (SK. 7.5.61)

Television

In May 1960 there were four television centres in Kazakhstan: in Alma-Ata, Karaganda, Ust'-Kamenogorsk and Dzhezkazgan, and three relay stations, in Chimkent, Leninogorsk and the village of Serebryanka in the East-Kazakhstan oblast. In that year a two programme television service was to be started and television centres in Petropavlovsk and Aktyubinsk put into operation. (KP. 7.5.60)

In Uzbekistan there are two television transmitters, in Tashkent and Andizhan, and nine relay stations. (On the other hand, the SMALL SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA (1960) reported only one television transmitter, at Tashkent, and five relay stations at Fergana, Samarkand, Namangan, Yangi-Yer and Begovat.) By the end of 1961 television will reach all parts of the country - no other republic can boast such a rapid development of its television services. A few years ago television was a great rarity in the Fergana Valley and now there is no village without at least ten sets working. In 1964 colour television will start in Uzbekistan. (PV. 27.3.60, 7.5.60, 3.12.60) In practice, however, the situation is not quite so good. Last winter television sets in Angren had to stand idle for two and a half months or more while the city relay station was being moved to another place. In fact it keeps wandering from place to place and its staff continually changes, so on each occasion the population is deprived of broadcasts for 10-15 days. Once they are restored, the quality of the picture is poorer than before. For the last three years the Ministry of Communications has been flooded with complaints and the Minister, Sharkov, says, "I am fed up with that Angren business". But nothing gets done under the pretext that the relay station does not belong to the Ministry. In fact, the Ministry, when selling it to the city, failed to make sure it had been erected at a suitable spot. Relaying is bad also in Namangan but Sharkov ignores the complaints pouring in. The same trouble is going on in Samarkand, and the Ministry confines its activities to promises

of help. At Yangi-Abad and Begovat relaying is so bad that broadcasts from Tashkent cannot be received: either sound or picture fades or signals from the Baku television centre appear. (PV. 1.2.61, 11.5.61)

In Tadzhikistan difficult geographical conditions seriously hinder the extension of television services to all parts of the country. Transmissions from Stalinabad cover the Gissar valley, while Leninabad and its environs and the mountain region view relayed programmes from Tashkent. The Vakhsh valley and the Kulyab group of rayons are at present outside the area served by Stalinabad. At the end of 1962 a new relay line, now under construction, will link them up with the capital. Both the Stalinabad television centre and the Leninabad relay station started work in 1959. Tadzhik television will soon start a second programme. (KT. 14.5.60, 16.12.60, 11.2.61, 7.5.61)

It seems that in Turkmenistan television is less developed than in the other Central Asian countries. The building of the Ashkhabad television centre started in 1957 and was still unfinished at the end of 1959 when it was due to be completed. By August 1960 only one building was ready. Bad working conditions and overcrowding are responsible for the poor standard of Ashkhabad broadcasts. The centre is being built by the Ashkhabadstroy trust and there is no hope that it will be completed soon. (TI. 6.8.60)

In Kirgizia, in spite of the difficult mountainous country, the area served by television is steadily expanding. By November 1960 the line connecting the northern part of the country with Frunze was almost completed; it will serve the Tyan'-Shan' and Issyk-Kul' region. The necessary equipment has been installed on the Alma-Ata - Frunze and Frunze - Yuzhnaya highland station line which will bring Frunze and Alma-Ata transmissions to both Frunze and the Chu valley, and Frunze broadcasts to the Osh oblast situated on the other side of the Tyan'-Shan'. Television thus covers four-fifths of Kirgizia. (SK. 2.11.60)

Inter-republic link-ups are also being constructed. In 1960 a transmitter started work in Frunze; it relays Alma-Ata programmes. Another transmitter, still being built, will link Frunze with Tashkent. A television main line (magistral'), now under construction, will run from Sverdlovsk to Tashkent and from there to Frunze; it will bring Moscow transmissions to the Kirgiz capital. (SK. 18.9.60) A relay line is being built to connect Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan. (BR. 28.8.60)

Maintenance

Television and radio repair services are unsatisfactory. Although in 1959, 10 such workshops were opened in Kirgizia, having a set put

right remains a serious problem. The workshop at Naryn is not easily accessible and that at Kizyl-Kiya is still not open. In 1960, 27 workshops were to be opened but by September only two had started work. They lack both qualified staff and equipment. (KS. 9.9.60) In Azerbaydzhan the No.22 workshop has four branches, two of these in Baku, and its staff sometimes damage television sets still further instead of repairing them. The main workshop is housed in much too small a building and suffers from an acute shortage of spare parts for television sets. Thus it may take as much as 15 days instead of the three prescribed to repair a set. (BR. 3.1.61)

In Tashkent there is only one such workshop and customers queue up for two hours. Before a repair can be made, one has to wait for months for spare parts. Over 1,500 people have been waiting for cathode ray tubes for over four months. In February 1960 the workshop started a campaign to obtain accommodation to set up branches, but the gorispolkom has ignored the petition. In the provinces there are no workshops at all. (PV. 17.3.61)

III. Programme Organization

Each republic has a broadcasting committee attached to the republican Soviet of Ministers, as well as smaller broadcasting organizations, the smallest of which are maintained by the kolkhozes and sovkhozes for their own local broadcasting. The work of the bigger organizations is done by a number of "editorial boards" (redaktsiya), each concerned with some special subject. Thus the Baku radio and television centre has, among others, editorial boards dealing with industry, young people, literature, drama, etc. They are busy propagating the resolutions of the January Plenum and "mobilizing the workers to carry them out". Thus the industrial board prepares programmes on the "patronage extended by the town to the country". The youth board describes the work and studies of young agricultural machinery operators, particularly girl followers of the celebrated Uzbek cotton grower, Akhundova. The republican Komsomol "patronizes" maize growing and the board has set up "control radio posts of young maize growers which report systematically the situation on the maize front". The literary and dramatic board is also busy trying to "illuminate more fully and brightly the life of the Soviet people" in a series of broadcasts entitled "Heroes of Our Days", "The Fires of Communism", "People of our Village" etc. (BR. 7.5.61) Thus, whatever subject a board is responsible for, it does the same work as all the other boards, prompting the people to produce more. In this way radio and television do the same work as the 'agitators' and the press whose main concern is to encourage the public to work harder. To round of its work, the Azerbaydzhan broadcasting committee has

started a series of television broadcasts called "Why Are You Lagging Behind?" which denounce "collectives lagging behind"; this "helps to expose and overcome errors and shortcomings". (Ibid.)

The editorial boards receive some at least of their materials from "supernumerary" authors. In Kirgizia in 1957 there were 550 of these and in 1960 about 1,500. Among them are the best workers and innovators, kolkhoz and sovkhoz chairmen, factory directors and agricultural and industrial specialists. (SK. 7.5.60) Writers are sometimes less willing to cooperate - thus in Azerbaydzhan "authors and journalists taking an active part in preparing sound broadcasts for some reason do not want to write for television". (BR. 7.5.60) This may have something to do with their interest in the film industry whose relations with Kazakhstan television, for instance, are not of the best. The film industry people believe that television hinders the fulfilment of their financial quotas. (KP. 1.4.61)

The oblast broadcasting authorities receive a good deal of material from local people. Thus in the Aktyubinsk oblast the local literary union supplies the local monthly literary programme with its products and at the beginning of broadcasts such new authors are introduced to the public. (KP. 23.3.60)

In May-June 1960 local broadcasts started from Krasnovodsk, Nebit-Dag and Chardzhou. The local Party cells have set up editorial boards whose members are recruited from among Party and soviet officials, the intelligentsia and journalists. This type of "communal" (obshchestvennoye) broadcasting, carried on entirely by unpaid local volunteers, is developing throughout Turkmenistan. Such broadcasts are now being made from 19 towns and rayon centres and many kolkhozes. Although all the board members have full time jobs, they find time to prepare and broadcast material. (TI. 28.4.61)

IV. Programme Content

Propaganda by exhortation

The Central Committee of the Party has required the Party cells "to exploit sound and television broadcasts more fully for the purpose of propagating the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and mobilizing the workers to struggle for the successful execution of the plan of Communist construction." (KP. 23.3.60) Accordingly, the most common subject of broadcasts are various aspects of work in agriculture and industry, with the object of prompting the listener to produce more in less time. In all the republics complaints are made that this is not done well enough yet. Thus although Kazakh radio now pays more attention to the

Party and Government resolutions, many broadcasts are still "badly put together and prepared in a perfunctory manner, without a deep knowledge of life and disregarding the interests and requirements of the workers. The propaganda of the best working methods is very limited and done amateurishly. Work with authors is badly organized and contact with the working people, best workers and industrial innovators (our beacons (mayak)), is irregular. Instead of personal talks by the actual creators of material wealth, dry, colourless and vague scripts written by the so-called "contract" scribes are broadcast. They are ready to write on any subject provided they get paid. Our radio has not become yet a genuine propagandist of everything that is new and most progressive in the life of the republic." (KP. 1.4.61) Even when the "actual creators of material wealth" are allowed to speak, the result is disappointing: "Sometimes the best workers, tractor and combine drivers, milkmaids, swineherds etc. take part in broadcasts but, in the first place, they are given very little time and, secondly, one feels that they often read from scripts. One can't help feeling sorry for those comrades who are induced to speak in some language other than their own and to read a badly written text." (KP. 23.3.60)

The same is true of some oblast broadcasts. The talks given on Semipalatinsk radio are "pale and dry". For example, "like all engaged in the country's agriculture, the kolkhozniks and workers of the sovkhozes of the Irtysh region take part in the enthusiastic struggle for translating into life the historic resolutions of the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. But this enthusiasm of labour cannot be felt in the broadcasts of the oblast radio. It announces individual facts in dry, bureaucratic language and does not attempt to draw general conclusions. Standard news, in which only figures and surnames change, wander from one programme to another." Almost nothing is said about the struggle to carry out socialist obligations. Also the "Current News" is "drawn up according to firmly established clichés and one broadcast hardly differs from another. They lack actuality, are dully presented and of little importance, and they cover only a small area. Moreover, they are at times abstract (sic) as well." Pavlodar radio, on the other hand, is much more efficient. It criticizes severely loafers and bureaucrats who hinder good progress in the socialist obligations undertaken by the oblast. All the oblast listens to the pungent satirical series 'Let Us Introduce. . .' The interest of the listeners in the satirical programmes of Pavlodar radio is not casual. As a rule, they hit their target." (KP. 23.3.60)

The South-Kazakhstan oblast radio concentrates upon the socialist obligations taken by the oblast to supply to the State in 1960, 210,000 tons of raw cotton, 51,000 tons of meat, 10,500 tons of wool etc. Television also does its best and the Karaganda television centre started in March 1960 a series of broadcasts on production problems -

"Increasing the Productivity of Labour in the Collieries and Reducing the Cost Price of a Ton of Coal" and "Problems of the Correct Selection of Seed". A regular feature of Ust'-Kamenogorsk television is the "School of the Best [Working] Methods". (KP. 6.4.60, 1.4.61)

Kirgiz radio has also much room for improvement. The Kirgiz Central Committee declares that it still does not "give enough help to the Party, Soviet and economic organizations in the task of educating the working masses in the Communist manner and mobilizing the creative energy of the masses for the purpose of achieving the targets of economic and cultural development." In spite of the fact that in the first four months of 1961 over 300 people engaged in agriculture took part in broadcasts and that in permanent features like "People of the Seven-Year Plan" and "Our Contemporaries" the Kirgiz broadcasting organization shows the "greatness of the Soviet man, the hero of our time", "it must be admitted that the link of the republican radio and television with life is still weak, broadcasts are frequently dull and monotonous, subjects of secondary importance are discussed in them while important problems of developing kolkhoz production are not dealt with." (SK. 7.5.61

Radio can be used to organize socialist competitions. Thus the dockers of Krasnovodsk have challenged their Odessa colleagues. (TI. 7.5.61) On 19 March 1961 Kirgiz and Kazakh radio arranged in honour of the forthcoming XXIInd Party Congress a direct link between Frunze and Alma-Ata. It enabled the chairman of Alma-Ata kolkhoz of the same oblast to challenge Engels kolkhoz in the Frunze oblast. The latter's chairman accepted and said, "We shall see in the autumn whose 'queen of the fields' [maize] will turn out better." (SK. 23.3.61)

Dissemination of "culture"

Another important group of broadcasts supplies the working masses with "culture". It includes concerts, literary reviews, regular "University of Culture by Radio" talks and plays. A play by A. Levin, FILIN, broadcast by the Ashkhabad television centre, has been warmly approved by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 23.9.60 as "interesting and temperamental". It tells of the "watchfulness of the Soviet people and perfidy of the US intelligence". The plot is as follows: "In an area occupied by our troops preparing offensive operations against the Fascists an American 'flying fortress' makes an emergency landing. Its crew includes an inveterate enemy and spy, Gemp, acting as a radio operator. He has orders from the Pentagon to discover the spot where the Soviet troops will cross [a river?] and inform the Germans about it. But Soviet counter-espionage men see through his schemes and palm off false information upon him. To cut the story short, the spy is unmasked.

The Soviet troops make the crossing at a spot where the Germans do not expect them."

The propagation of "friendship between peoples"

Finally, the propagation of mutual friendly feelings among the Soviet peoples is an important responsibility of the broadcasting authorities. Kirgiz radio and television describe constantly the life of the brother republics and of the People's Democracies. There are weekly programmes "In the Brother Republics" and regular "radio days" devoted to them are arranged. In May 1961 a feature called "From the Caspian to the Tyan'-Shan'" was broadcast; it was meant for Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Turkmenistan. (SK. 7.5.61) Turkmen relay stations recorded talks with other republican radio, eight talks supplied by Turkmenistan were broadcast in Latvia at the end of April 1961. (TI. 7.5.61)

Academician S. Kenesbayev is greatly interested in propagating this friendship by Kazakh radio. "The broadcasts deal with most diverse problems, among which detailed descriptions of the friendship among the peoples of our countries should occupy their proper place. It is no secret to anybody that our antagonists abroad never cease to spread malicious slander against the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. They calumniate also Soviet Kazakhstan and try to discredit the achievements of the workers of our republic." This should be counteracted by Kazakh radio giving account of various aspects of life of the brother republics. Programmes should include "Russian singers performing Kazakh repertoire and conversely Kazakh artists presenting Russian repertoire. This may be of great educational value.

"In discussing the origins and bonds of friendship, it would be advisable to give more broadcasts containing opinions of Russian scholars and writers on Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people, and also those of Kazakh scholars and authors on the great Russian people etc. Scholars can give much help to the radio staff. Especially we philologists should emphasize by all means the interdependence of the literatures of the USSR peoples. [Our] chief duty is to show the beneficent influence of Russian culture and literature on the Kazakh and other peoples of our country. We can also do much to show the influence of the Russian language on the languages of the peoples and nationalities of the Soviet Union." (KP. 23.3.60)

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Although press comment on television and radio programmes is confined to their considerable propaganda content, it is obvious that an appreciable amount of entertainment must be included to attract viewers and listeners. The following programmes have been selected at random.

Television (Tashkent, Sunday, 13.8.61)

12.00	Physical Culture
12.20	Film, "True Tales"
12.50	Artistic film, "Andreyka" (in Uzbek)
18.30	Film Magazine, "Pioneriya"
18.45	Cartoon, "Brave Hans"
19.05	News
19.25	Talk on the occasion of "Builders' Day", followed by a builders' request concert
20.55	Documentary, "The Truth about the Holy Places"
21.05	Indian artistic film, "The People Awake" (2nd series)
22.30	Advertisements and announcements

(On weekdays programmes begin at 17.00 hours)

Radio (Stalinabad, Monday, 14.8.61)

08.30	Concert by Radio and Television stars
09.20	Discussion on "A New Stage in the Development of Marxist-Leninist Thought"
09.35	Scenes, songs and choruses from old Russian operas
10.15	Discussion on agricultural subjects
10.30	Turkmen music
15.20	Talk for women
15.35	Concert by amateurs
17.05	Review of No.7 of the magazine MASH'AL (The Torch)
17.45	Excerpts from Yarullin's opera SHURALE
18.20	Concert in the "Music of the People" series
19.50	International Review
20.10	Talk, "The Voices of Friends"

20.35 Orchestral selections by Andreyev's National Instruments' Orchestra

21.20 Concert by outstanding artistes.

Archaeological discovery during hydroelectric scheme excavations

In the course of work on an artificial lake on the Vakhsh river, part of the Nurek hydroelectric scheme, several interesting pieces of pottery have been found. They are typical examples of village pottery of the 10th-12th centuries. The finds were made on a hill called Shotur-khan, a resting-place for camels, and it is probably the site of a village on the trade route which linked Turkestan with Iran and India. VOKRUG SVETA, 1961, No.7

N E W S D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 July - 30 September 1961. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Turkmenistan

The Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR has appointed Ch. Atayev President of the State Planning Committee. TI. 27.8.61

Uzbekistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 27 September 1961, R. Kurbanov has been appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR. PV. 28.9.61

Tadzhikistan

As a result of the voting held between 30 July - 8 August 1961 the following officials have been relieved of their membership of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

Ul'dzhabayev, Tursunbay, deputy from the Leninabad town constituency No.713, Tadzhik SSR; Obnosov, Petr Stepanovich, deputy of the Soviet of Nationalities, Dangara constituency, No.282, Tadzhik SSR; Ibragimov, Khalil, deputy of the Soviet of Nationalities, Shakhristan constituency No.291, Tadzhik SSR; Dodkhudoyev, Nazarsho, deputy of the Soviet of Nationalities, Ordzhonikidzeabad constituency No.298, Tadzhik SSR; Koshchanov, Sarap, deputy of the Soviet of Nationalities, Kalinin constituency No.349, Turkmen SSR.

[All these changes seem to be related to the dismissal of Ul'dzhabayev from the post of First Party Secretary (see CAR, 1961, No.2, p.188) - Ed.]

VVS. 8.9.61

Territorial changes

Turkmenistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet the settlement Okarem, Gasan-Kuli rayon, Ashkhabad oblast has been given the status of town-type settlement. TI. 7.9.61

Uzbekistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 4 July 1961, the centre of the Urgench rayon has been transferred from the town of Urgench to the settlement Yangibazar. VVS. 13.7.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 3 August 1961, a new rayon named Komsomol' has been formed in the Tashkent oblast. Its centre is the village Krest'yanskiy. VVS. 25.8.61

Tadzhikistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 12 July 1961, the town Nurek, Ordzhonikidzeabad rayon, has been given the status of a town of republic subordination. VVS. 20.7.61

Kazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 19 June 1961, the town-type settlement Ushtobe, Karatal rayon, Alma-Ata oblast has been given the status of a town of rayon subordination. VVS. 29.6.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 15 August 1961, the following settlements in the Karaganda oblast have been transferred to the category of town of oblast subordination: Tentek, which has been renamed Shakhtinsk; and Churubay-Nura, which has been renamed Abay. VVS. 8.9.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 18 August 1961, the town-type settlement Alga, Klyuchevoy rayon, Aktyubinsk oblast, has been transferred to the category of a town of rayon subordination. VVS. 8.9.61

ARCHAEOLOGY

Recently the archaeological expedition of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences to the Chu valley has discovered a series of mounds which contain very interesting and valuable relics. They excavated a 12

metre high statue which probably represents a goddess and comes from a Buddhist monastery recorded as having been on this site between the 8th and 10th centuries A.D. These mounds link up with a series of archaeological sites stretching over 17 km., now called Krasnorechensk. This is probably identical with the ancient town of Saryt, recorded in several documents. This town existed from the 5th century A.D. until the 13th century when it was destroyed by the invading Mongols.

SK. 8.7.61

The Issyk-Kul' branch of the Institute of History, Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, has excavated brickworks dating from the 14th-15th centuries near the village of Tory-Aygur. Parts of buildings, tools and implements were found to have been exceptionally well preserved. Not far from this site they have discovered ruins built from similar brick. These finds indicate that the people who inhabited the area round Lake Issyk-Kul' had a remarkably high standard of civilization. This assumption is confirmed by the discovery of large brick walls, aquaducts, pottery and tools beneath the waters of the lake.

SK. 18.8.61

ETHNOGRAPHY

Historical Ethnographical Atlas of Central Asia and Kazakhstan

The compilation of a historical ethnographical atlas of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was discussed by T.A. Zhdanko in an article in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.3 of 1955. The first volume of preparatory material for this work, MATERIALY K ISTORIKO-ETNOGRAFICHESKOMU ATLASU SREDNEY AZII I KAZAKHSTANA, Moscow-Leningrad, 1961, has now appeared. An editorial note states that the atlas will show the history of the culture of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan from ancient times up to the October Revolution. The Institute of Ethnography of the AN SSSR, the Academies of Sciences of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and also a number of museums will take part in its publication. The compilation of the atlas is planned to take several years. At the moment the first part "Land Cultivation and Irrigation" is being prepared for publication; simultaneously work is in hand on other sections - "Livestock Breeding", "Dwellings and Settlements", "Handicrafts", "Folk Costume", "Applied Art" and "Religious Beliefs and Rites". The present volume contains maps of Central Asia as a whole and the Tashauz oblast of the Turkmen SSSR compiled from historical and ethnographical data, detailed instructions for the collection of material on village settlements and dwellings, and on folk costume, a draft outline of the section "Land Cultivation and Irrigation" with a list of maps and tables, descriptions of museum collections which can be used for the atlas and two researches on

subjects for the atlas (the history of pottery making and of dwellings among the Kazakhs). Subsequent volumes will be devoted to similar material including draft maps and typological tables for general discussion. (See also CAR, 1958, No.2, pp.156-8.)

IRRIGATION

A large underground lake has been discovered under the Fergana Valley at a depth of 700-800 metres. Plans have been made for the exploitation of this water which can be used both for drinking and irrigation. About one quarter, 8,000 sq.km. of the whole valley is at present arid and once this water is brought to the surface it will be enough to bring a large part of this area under cultivation. SK. 27.8.61

A large reservoir and dam for a hydroelectric power-station is under construction near the settlement Chardar, South-Kazakhstan oblast. Water from the Syr-Dar'ya will be led to this reservoir which will have a cubic capacity of six milliard cubic metres. The surplus water will be used for the irrigation of a wide area. KP. 23.8.61

The third section of the Karakum canal

The construction of the third section of the Karakum canal has begun and it is planned to be completed in 1962. This section, from the river Tedzhen to Ashkhabad, will be 256 km. long (see map).

The canal will supply Ashkhabad with 6 cu. metres of water per second, 2 cu. metres per second will go to sovkhozes, fields and orchards and the industrial establishments at Bezmeyn will get 1 cu. metre per second.

The canal will flow to the north of Ashkhabad where two large reservoirs will be built, one for irrigation to the north-west of the town covering an area of 10,6 sq. km. with an average depth of 4 metres; the other, to the north-east of the town, occupying an area of 3,3 sq. km. with an average depth of 2 metres will be used for sports and recreation. North of the town a 6 km. section of the canal will be 60 metres wide and its banks specially arranged as beaches. A park covering an area of 1,800 hectares is planned between the canal and the town, and a 18 km. long road will connect the town with the park and beaches. (See CAR, 1960, No.2, pp.138-40.) TI. 4.8.61

EDUCATION

An article by A. Arkhipova in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, 1961, No. 7, discusses the ever recurring problem of anti-religious propaganda. There have been several cases recently of parents forbidding their children to join the Young Pioneers. Teachers in various schools in Karaganda when trying to explain to the parents what a serious mistake they make in not letting their children join their friends in Communist youth organizations, were shocked to discover "deeply ingrained religious prejudices" which are supposed to be the result of the persistent activities of religious sects, especially of the Baptists and Mennonites.

[This case in Karaganda is only one of the many attacks on Baptists and Mennonites in Kazakhstan. These sects, probably relying on German nationals (out of the 1,619,000 Germans in the Soviet Union about 700,000 are believed to live in Kazakhstan), cause the greatest trouble to Kazakh Party organizations trying to educate the people in "a spirit of scientific atheism". - Ed.]

A new school of music was opened this autumn in the town of Regar, Tadzhik SSR. Children at this school can learn the piano, violin, viola and violincello as well as national musical instruments. There are now seven schools of music in Tadzhikistan attached to which are five smaller institutions. KT. 17.9.61

LITERATURE

A large bronze statue of Samed Vurgun, Soviet Azerbaydzhani poet, was unveiled in Baku in July 1961. The statue is the work of the national artist Fuad Abdurakhmanov. The speeches delivered at this official ceremony were of unqualified praise, indicating that all controversy

over the poet has been forgotten.

[In spite of his flawless career as a Communist poet in the twenties, Vurgun ran into difficulties as Secretary to the Union of Soviet Authors of Azerbaydzhan; he was severely criticized for a lack of vigilance and had a narrow escape from the purges of 1937. In 1948, when President of the Writers' Union, he was again attacked for his failure in solving "vital ideological problems". He died in 1956. - Ed.] LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN, 1961, No.8

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The population of Alma-Ata is rapidly growing. The government of the Republic has put forward a plan for the formation of Greater Alma-Ata which would include some outlying suburbs. Two of these, Taglar and Keskelen, are at present rayon centres. The third is expected to grow up rapidly on the shores of the future Iliyskoye reservoir. P. 17.8.61

At the suggestion of Mr. Khrushchev, chemists have applied themselves to finding the most suitable synthetic material for yurts, the traditional tents of Central Asian nomads. Although all nomads were settled after the October Revolution, there is still a section of the population which has had to retain the nomadic way of life: these are the shepherds, roaming the steppes with their flocks in search of pastures. They fulfil a very important function in the national economy. As long as there are shepherds, yurts are indispensable. However, the felt yurts produced so far have been of a rather inferior quality, easily ruined by rain or wind. Now scientists have found materials which make excellent yurts: the walls are made of foam plastic, an elastic and light material and they rest on collapsible glass-fibre poles. Outside the yurt is covered with kapron impregnated with polymer substances which withstand rotting and fire. Four different types of yurts have been designed: two smaller types for living, a larger one called "red yurt" which would serve as a club for the shepherds, and an even larger type made of double sheets of fibre glass to be used as a school for children. These synthetic yurts are 33-50 per cent lighter than those made of felt. The authors of the article conclude that the only task which remains now is to organize their large-scale production. P. 12.6.61

COMMUNICATIONS

The construction of a new road from Alma-Ata to Ust'-Kamengorsk is now in progress. This will be a first-class road linking the capital of Kazakhstan with the northern districts of the Republic and also, through Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar and Omsk, with the road network of the RSFSR. The total length of the new road will be 1,200 km. and it will pass through the towns of Taldy-Kurgan, Sarkand, Uch-Aral, Ayaguz, Zhangiz-Tobe and Georgiyevka. The road is planned to be completed in three years. KP. 29.7.61

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

RECENT EVENTS IN NEPAL: THE SOVIET VIEW

I.B. Red'ko, the author of a short general work on Nepal published in Tashkent in 1958 (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1960, No.1, pp.106-8), has now produced a second work, NEPAL POSLE VTOROY MIROVOY VOYNY (Nepal After the Second World War), published this time in Moscow (1960). Apart from some brief mentions in the introduction and conclusion, the present work does not deal with any events subsequent to those described in the 1958 book. In response, perhaps, to a critical review of the earlier work, he now includes a good deal more information on the role of the Communist Party of Nepal as well as of the so-called national liberation struggle.

In describing the Nepalese Communist Party, Red'ko is careful to place it on a par with other political parties and to avoid crediting it with too independent a role. Criticisms of the King which appeared in the earlier book are omitted and the author is evidently anxious to show the support of the Communist Party, as well as of the Soviet Government, for the present Nepalese Government. He hints, however, that this support is only tactical. Red'ko's present treatment of Nepal's relations with China and the Soviet Union is of particular interest. In the main body of the book, as well as in the conclusion, he devotes considerably more attention to China's influence, and he tries to prove that Nepal's agreement with China signed in September 1956 implied Nepalese recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. But in the introduction, which was obviously written later than the conclusion, greater emphasis is given to Soviet influence and economic aid.

Much of the source material used for the present book is the same as that used in the earlier work, but more use is made of Nepalese Communist Party publications.

. . .

I. General Description - II. The Overthrow of the Rana Family - III. Events following the Overthrow - IV. Evaluation of the First Nepalese Five-Year Plan and of the Agrarian Reforms - V. Recent Developments and Nepal's Relations with China and the USSR.

I. General Description

I.B. Red'ko uses a wide range of sources, but apparently most of them are second-hand. British and other Western books, including mémoires, travelogues and books and articles written by former residents or travellers in this part of the world are used, despite "distortions" seen by the author. Primarily, however, he relies on magazine and newspaper articles from Nepalese, Indian, Pakistani, British and American sources. He places much stress on the importance of articles and declarations by leading figures of the Communist Party of Nepal published in the Indian newspaper CROSS-ROADS.

The introduction to the book gives general information on Nepal, including several maps of the administrative divisions and nationalities. A summary is given of the geography and climatic conditions, the distribution of the people, the linguistic groups and the main religions. Nepal is divided into two main groups, those speaking languages of Tibetan and Burmese origin and those having languages of Indian origin. The first group are the native inhabitants of Nepal. The State language is Nepali spoken by almost half of the people, with another 1,100,000 considering it as their second language. Almost 90 per cent of the Nepalese are Hindus, 9 per cent Buddhists and one per cent Muslims.

Part I, comprising almost two-fifths of the book, details the main features of the historical development of Nepal. The first chapter of this section is concerned with the formation of the Nepalese feudal state and British colonial policy. Red'ko sees the whole "anti-feudal and anti-imperialist" movement of the Nepalese people as one of the manifestations of the crisis and collapse of the colonial system and imperialism, but Nepal herself had some distinctive features. In the historical development of the country in the 18th and 19th centuries, two distinctly contradictory tendencies stood out. One was towards the consolidation of an independent centralized state, with an economy based on state ownership of land; and the other was towards a weakening of central power, and an increase in the struggle for power among the various feudal families, with economic power based on the strengthening and expansion of private feudal property gained at the expense of the state and of the peasants. According to the author, the second tendency started to forge ahead in the 19th century, as a

Reproduced from *Nepal Posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny*,
by I. B. Red'ko (Moscow, 1960)

direct consequence of British colonial policy. This resulted in a weakening of the power of the Crown and in a reduction and gradual elimination of the duties of the Prime Minister. Leading Government posts gradually became the "hereditary monopolistic privilege" of the feudal Rana family, which "usurped power with the aid of the British as a result of a state revolution in 1846" and adopted a pro-British attitude. The state structure of Nepal then facilitated the conserving of the most backward institutions of the Middle Ages. Nepal, according to Red'ko, was converted into a recruiting area for the British Army, and the British are accused of using Nepalese troops to suppress national liberation movements in India and elsewhere in the Empire. It was after the conquest of Bengal by the British in 1764 that Nepal began to occupy an important place in the foreign policy of the British East India Company, "which was striving to penetrate into Tibet and the interior of China".

The second chapter of this first section deals with the history of Nepal between two world wars and with the origins of the Nepalese democratic movement. After the First World War, according to Red'ko, Nepal was one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. It had few roads, and no telephones or postal system. Only in 1927 was the first railway built. Agricultural workers were hired by the day or the year, and paid mainly in food and a small payment in kind or money. There were many slaves. Up to the 20th century the struggle against the rule of the Rana family was limited to plots by feudal lords and aristocrats not belonging to the ruling family. At the beginning of the present century, however, the struggle against the Rana family emerged from behind the palace walls. The start of the national liberation struggle of 1905–8 in India is given credit for having awakened the national consciousness of the Nepalese. The intelligentsia saw the Rana family's autocratic control as the root cause of the incredible backwardness of the country, and they aimed at ending the role of this family, and at the creation of a constitutional monarchy. Many Nepalese nationalists received their education in India and were affected by the ideas of the Indian national liberation movement. Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress also had great influence on the educated Nepalese.

The author says that the whole liberation movement in Nepal up to the Second World War developed in difficult conditions due to the enforced isolation of Nepal from the outside world. He blames the British for the general social, economic and political backwardness of the country and claims that the feudal Rana hierarchy depended on the British authorities for their control. None of the parties depended on the masses. The only united element were the representatives of the upper strata of society, and they did not link the struggle against the monopolistic rule of the Rana family with the need to carry

out important social and economic reforms. Those active in the movement against the regime placed their hopes on the King. The great mass of the population, the peasantry, were under an economic and political yoke, and did not actively join in the work of political organization, which was limited mainly to the Katmandu valley. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the century, even within this feudal society there was a start towards the formation of new capitalist relations and new classes, that is, the national bourgeoisie and the working-class. The Nepalese bourgeoisie was represented by middle and petty traders and owners of small manufacturing enterprises. During and after the Second World War a number of industrial enterprises were built up. However, most of these were the property of foreign companies, so there was no equivalent strengthening of national capital. The largest group of the working-class was the agricultural proletariat, while the majority of factory workers came from the neighbouring areas of India.

II. The Overthrow of the Rana Family

The author divides the post war movement towards liberation in Nepal into two periods: 1945-51 and 1951 to the present. In the first stage, the overthrow of the Rana family was the chief national task before the country. In the circumstances existing in Nepal, this movement was linked with the slogan of the return to the King of his royal prerogatives. The leadership of the movement was concentrated in the hands of the Nepalese bourgeoisie and of the landowners opposed to the Rana family headed by the Nepalese Congress. During the war many Nepalese had fought abroad, and had returned with new ideas directed towards the liberation of the country. The appearance of the first capitalist enterprises during the war was accompanied by the formation of an industrial proletariat. The skilled workers came generally from India on contract with Indian companies. The unskilled workers were mainly Nepalese with strong links with the countryside. They were inhibited by feudal and patriarchal relations. Thus the whole national liberation movement was influenced strongly by contacts with India, both through Nepalese educated in India and through those Indian workers who came to work in Nepal. Red'ko also mentions the influence of China on this liberation movement.

In the first post war years the growth of the Nepalese anti-feudal and anti-imperialist movement was primarily among the Nepalese political emigrants, whose position radically changed when India gained her political independence. In October 1946, under Nehru's influence, a group of young Nepalese students at Benares University declared the creation of an All-Indian Nepalese National Congress and

called for the replacement of the dictatorial rule of the Rana family by representative government under the King. Its name was soon changed to the Nepalese National Congress. This was the first serious effort to associate Nepalese emigrants in India with the liberation struggle of the Nepalese people. Underground groups of this party were soon established in Nepal itself.

In 1948 the Prime Minister of Nepal was forced, according to the author, to resort to "constitutional manoeuvres" and came out with a manifesto that purported to proclaim civic freedoms and rights. This later became known as the "Constitution of 1948". It provided for a two-chamber parliament and local self-government. According to the author, however, it did not end the power of the Rana family, as "the right of succession to the post of Prime Minister was recognized as unchangeable". A decree in May 1948 forbade the holding of public meetings without police authority. A campaign of civil disobedience was initiated, and the Nepalese National Congress called for the granting of civic freedoms, the formation of a representative government, and for steps to be taken for the economic development of the country. But some members of the Party, especially the political emigrants, thought that the first step should be the application of the "Constitution of 1948", and these formed a new Party under the name of the Nepalese Democratic Panchayat. In 1949 the National Congress demanded the freeing of political prisoners, the legalization of the Party itself, the carrying out of declared constitutional reforms and the granting of civic freedoms. The left wing of the National Congress, including workers and members of the intelligentsia, opposed an attempt to merge the Party with another of the nation's parties. Despite this, some leaders of the National Congress met leaders of a party consisting of elements of the Rana Class "C" group,* and decided to unite in a new Nepalese Congress Party. A part of the original Nepalese National Congress, however, remained in existence. At the beginning of 1950, the more revolutionary elements left the Nepalese National Congress and formed the Communist Party of Nepal.

Following these events, internal dissensions continued to develop in the country, including open conflict between the King and the Prime Minister. During this period the Communist Party concerned itself with the urgent question of ending the supremacy of the Rana family. Following the outbreak of civil war in Nepal in 1950, the Communist Party called on the Nepalese Congress and other groups to form a single "national democratic front", and called for agrarian and other reforms. The author does not actually claim that the Communist

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* See Note at end

Party was leading the movement for the formation of a constitutional monarchy, but he continually seeks to associate it with the movement and with the leading political groups in the country. "In the opinion of the Communist Party of Nepal, the question of the return of the King to the throne and the forms of future state administration should be solved by a referendum. Despite their differences with the Nepalese Congress, the Communists took the most active part in the movement to bring the struggle against the ruling cliques of the Rana family to a victorious end and to turn the development of the anti-Rana movement into a mass struggle of workers for radical social and land reforms. . ." But the Congress leaders refused to unite with the Communists on the ground that differences between the parties on the prerogatives of the King precluded all possibilities of union. A cease-fire was finally organized, and a coalition government including the Nepalese Congress and the Rana Class "C" elements was established. This coalition government, however, according to Red'ko, was concerned with giving effect to the cease-fire, rather than with democratic reforms. Following more uprisings, a provisional Constitution was proclaimed in 1951, which provided for basic democratic rights and gave the King more power than the Prime Minister had previously held. Although the King became in effect an absolute monarch, the author sees the Constitution of 1951 as a definite achievement of the democratic movement. Later in the year a group of parties, including the Nepalese Praja Parishad, the Communist Party, and some left-wing groups of peasants, trade unions and students, united in a single Peoples National United Democratic Front, with the chairman of its Organization Committee from the Nepalese Praja Parishad, and its secretary from the Communist Party. It opposed the compromise of the Nepalese Congress with Rana elements. According to Red'ko, pressure from this Front caused the resignation of the Government, and in October a Consultative Council, all of whose members were to be appointed by the King, was created. The Nepalese Congress was given 28 of the 45 seats on this Council, but the Front group got no seats. In November the Congress ministers in the Government resigned, and this marked the end of the Rana dynasty. As the author sees it, the absence of unity in the ruling group itself facilitated the victory of the "liberation forces".

III. Events following the Overthrow

With the end of the rule of the Rana dynasty, according to the author, the country was for the first time able to see the realization of special social and economic reforms. In the new political situation, however, "the bourgeois landowning parties which had entered the United Front avoided joint action with the Communist Party and other workers' organizations, and this led to the breakup of the United Front. The

absence of unity in the ranks of the democratic forces gave the ruling circles the opportunity to delay for a time the carrying out of social and economic reforms." There followed a succession of governments, the first one being headed by the Nepalese Congress. Under this the Communist Party was banned in January 1952. Following demands for a coalition government, an administration of "direct rule" by the King was instituted. The Communist Party, now underground, said that "direct rule" could not lead to an improvement in the position of the workers, and called for a government of democratic unity. In June 1953 a government was established by the National Democratic Party. It was followed in a few months by a new coalition government and the formation of a Consultative Assembly in April 1954 pending the holding of general elections. A second regime of "direct rule" was followed by a government formed by the Nepalese Praja Parishad, which, under T.P. Achariya, took over in January 1956. This was to mark the end, for the time being, of the struggle for a stable government.

In commenting on the Anglo-Nepalese agreement on the opening of Gurkha recruiting centres on Nepalese territory in substitution of those on Indian territory which had been closed in 1952, the author claims that this agreement caused a wave of popular protest in Nepal and a demonstration of "solidarity with the colonial peoples fighting for their independence". (P.230) He particularly attacks the activities of the Americans in Nepal at this time. He accuses them of sending missionaries to set up various philanthropic institutions, such as shelters, alms-houses, hospitals, anti-malarial points, "which became centres for the collection of information and the smuggling of intelligence officers into Nepal and the Tibet area of China". He is here referring to the establishment of these centres in Indian border areas. Other accusations of spying and attempts to create a military base of Nepal are made by the author, and he claims that the United States Information Service was responsible for many nefarious operations such as anti-Indian propaganda and collaboration with Rana elements.

IV. Evaluation of the First Nepalese Five-Year Plan and of the Agrarian Reforms

The Government of the Nepalese Praja Parishad came to power with the support of a united democratic movement; but it faced a serious economic situation. Agriculture in particular was in a critical state. In the author's view, it is the "logic of events" which had brought the ruling class to a point where, "for the preservation of its own position, it had to make concessions to democratic forces and work out constructive programmes for overcoming the critical situation of the

country's economy and for the strengthening of its independence." Despite this attitude, the Communist Party is supporting the present Government, though it makes clear that this support may not be permanent when it says that "the contradictions between the Nepalese national bourgeoisie, interested in the development of industry and the expansion of the internal market, and feudalism exist objectively, and will grow as a result of the strengthening of the economic position of the bourgeoisie."

In January 1956 T.P. Achariya, the Prime Minister, outlined his basic programme. His foreign policy was to include the support of all United Nations measures directed towards strengthening peace, anti-colonialism, the establishment of friendly relations with all democratic countries and the acceptance of economic aid presented without discriminatory conditions. He also called for general elections, the stabilization of the Nepalese currency, the reorganization of the state apparatus and measures to deal with corruption and nepotism. His Party advocated a constitutional monarchy with limited constitutional powers, and was ready to cooperate with the Nepalese Congress and the National Congress Parties. The Government took steps to strengthen the country's currency and financial situation by creating a State Bank which was to have the power to issue paper money, strengthen the stability of the currency, and mobilize capital for economic development. It opened eight agricultural banks with a capital of 9.7 million rupees to develop credit for the use of agriculture.

The biggest and most important measure of the Government, according to Red'ko, was the creation of the first Five-Year Plan (1956/7-1960/1), to increase production and the employment of the population, and to raise the standard of living. Attention was to be paid to the development of transport, agriculture and hydroelectric power. Of the budget, 31.4 per cent was to be allotted to improving agriculture - the building of roads, well-sinking, the distribution of selected seeds and fertilizers, the development of horticulture, anti-erosion measures and, finally, improvement in the living conditions, health and education of the people. Another part of the budget was allotted to improving irrigation, the utilization of rivers and the freeing of Nepal's timber resources. A further 16.4 per cent of the budget was set apart for the construction of industrial enterprises and hydroelectric power-stations, and many plans were made for the improvement of transport and communications. The author approves the steps which have been taken, but sees a number of shortcomings. These include lack of a radical agrarian reform, the inadequate development of small industry and handicrafts, and the absence of a Government policy on industrial development. There is no provision

for regularizing the procurement of raw materials, and no indication of what is to be done about the creation of heavy industry. The weakest side of the Five-Year Plan, according to Red'ko, is its financing. Only 28.8 per cent of the plan can be financed from local resources. Part of it is to be paid for by deficit financing (the issuing of paper money), and this is certain to cause increased inflation. He sees a great danger in the fact that more than 70 per cent of the cost of the plan is to be covered by foreign aid, and the Government has not stated the conditions under which Nepal would agree to accept foreign aid, credit and loans.

Soon after the Five-Year Plan was promulgated, the King proclaimed a draft law for agrarian reform which would provide for limited graduated taxes on landowners. This is seen as an attempt not to end feudal land-ownership, but rather to organize it with a view to increasing the state's income. The proposed law for land reform establishes a maximum scale of rent to be paid by the tenant to the owner, amounting to one-quarter of the harvest. The landowner is deprived of the right to expel any tenant who has worked on land for more than two years. In addition, landowners no longer have the right to leave any land unworked for more than two years. Any violations of this provision will result in the Government's free distribution of such land. Under the new law peasants cannot be charged more than ten per cent interest per annum on loans. The law is criticized by Red'ko as not carrying out much needed radical changes in the system of land-ownership and land utilization. It is seen as directed not towards the liquidation of a land-owning class, but only towards the alleviation of the most negative sides of the "system of feudal yoke". Nevertheless, it has tended, according to the author, "to weaken the feudal and semi-feudal exploitation of the Nepalese peasantry".

The Five-Year Plan met with the approval and support of most of the Nepalese people. The Communist Party, which was legalized in April 1956, came out in support of the Government of the Nepalese Praja Parishad Party, making clear that it believed that Nepal "still has to overcome huge difficulties and the opposition of reactionary feudal circles which have continued to occupy important economic positions. . ." The Communist Party objects to the presence of what it calls "so-called independents, representing the interests of the feudal hierarchy", and has asked for their replacement in ministerial posts by members of the ruling party. Within these limits it has, at least temporarily, promised to support the present Government.

V. Recent Developments and Nepal's Relations with China and the USSR

It is curious that though this book was sent to the printers in April 1960, there is no mention whatever of internal economic or political events inside Nepal after 1956 except in the concluding section. In this conclusion it is noted that the second congress of the Communist Party of Nepal in 1957 joined other parties in a demand for general elections. Such elections were held on 18 February 1959, and the Nepalese Congress Party was victorious. The only comment by the author is that "they were conducted on the basis of the Constitution which was promulgated by a Crown proclamation on 12 February 1959. It should be emphasized that the Nepalese Constitution was not passed by a Constituent Assembly, as stipulated by the law of 1951, but 'bestowed by the King'. The Constitution proclaims the establishment of a constitutional monarchy as the form of government, conferring on the King wide executive as well as legislative powers. The promulgation of the Constitution and the carrying out of general elections have created more favourable opportunities for carrying out social economic reforms which do not brook delay." No mention is made of the fact that Achariya had promised elections in 1957, nor is there any mention of the development of Nepal's Five-Year Plan, which was initiated in 1956. These omissions are all the more curious when the present book is compared with that written by Red'ko in 1958. In the earlier book he refers to the organization in December 1957 of a movement of civil disobedience, with the object of obtaining general elections in Nepal within six months. In February 1958, King Mahendra reported his intention of forming a government which would be in charge until the general elections of 1959.

Throughout the main body of this book there is fairly frequent mention, though usually in passing, of Nepal's contacts with and influence by China, while the only reference to the Soviet Union is one brief reference to the influence of the October Revolution. In the last main chapter of the book, concerning Nepal's entrance into the international scene, considerable mention is made of the development of her relations with China. There is a description of the Indian-Chinese Agreement on the "Tibet area of China" signed on 29 April 1954, though the direct relevance of this matter to Nepal seems doubtful. The author writes that the "independent foreign policy followed by India, has aided the reduction of international tensions, the preservation and strengthening of peace in Asia and the whole world, and has had a growing influence on the foreign policy of Nepal. An especially important role has been played by the Indian-Chinese Agreement on the Tibet area of China. In it were formulated the well-known five principles of peaceful coexistence. . ."

According to Red'ko, the first negotiations between Nepal and China took place in November 1951. In July 1955 a Chinese Government delegation came to Katmandu, and on August 1st a joint communique was issued declaring the successful completion of conversations on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The first Chinese Ambassador arrived in April 1956. In September of that year an agreement was signed between the two countries concerning friendly relations between them and "on trade and intercourse between the Tibet area of China and Nepal". By this agreement, according to the author, Nepal accorded de jure sovereignty of China over Tibet and annulled all former treaties between Nepal and China. Nepal, the author continues, renounced such old privileges for its merchants trading with Tibet as the right of extraterritoriality, the right of military escort for Nepalese trade caravans in Tibet, etc. In order to develop "traditional trade links between Tibet and Nepal", the agreement provided for the opening of consulates in Lhasa and Katmandu, as well as the opening of three trading agencies in each country. A passport was introduced for Nepalese merchants living in Tibet, and a system of registration was established at frontier posts for pilgrims and others living in the border areas. Mention is made of an economic agreement signed in the autumn of 1956 between China and Nepal, in which China was "led by the desire to render aid to Nepal in the carrying out of her Five-Year Plan of economic development". China agreed to give aid to Nepal over a three-year period, beginning in 1957. "Out of a total of 60 million Indian rupees, 20 million were to be paid in cash, and 40 million in the form of machines , equipment and other goods." In January 1957 Premier Chou en-Lai of China visited Nepal "on the invitation of the Nepalese Government".

Very much less attention is given at this point to Nepal's relations with the Soviet Union. It is briefly noted that diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in July 1956, and both countries expressed their faith that this "would aid the further development of friendly cooperation and the strengthening of world peace". The first Soviet Ambassador arrived in Nepal in March 1957, and Achariya thanked the Soviet Union for supporting Nepal's entrance into the United Nations. He expressed his belief that the Nepalese Government "would in the future follow a policy of friendship with her great neighbours, India, China and the USSR". In his reply, the Soviet Ambassador said that the way was now open for new possibilities in the development of economic cooperation and cultural links between the two countries. No specific Soviet aid is mentioned in this last chapter. The concluding chapter ends only with a statement saying that "the progressive forces of Nepal are achieving further democratization of the state structure of the country, the strengthening of Nepal's friendly relations with China and India and with all peace-loving countries, seeing in this most important factor a

strengthening of the independence of the country and the assurance of the security of the Himalaya area." No mention is made of China's border dispute with Nepal.

Unlike the concluding chapter which gives prominence to Nepal's relations with China, the introduction, which was clearly written later, places all the emphasis on the development of Soviet-Nepalese relations. In June 1958 the King of Nepal visited the Soviet Union. On 24 April 1959 a Soviet-Nepalese economic agreement was signed, and the author details some of the aid to be given by the Soviet Union, including the building of a hydroelectric power-station, a sugar factory, highways connecting the eastern and western parts of Nepal, and a hospital in Katmandu. In February 1960 Voroshilov, Kozlov and Furtseva visited Nepal, and much is made of Soviet interest in Nepal's problems.

Note

The Rana regime of Prime Ministers and Commanders-in-Chief began in 1846 with Jangbahadur. He was succeeded first by his brother Udip, and then by the latter's three nephews, the last of whom, Chandra, became Prime Minister in 1901. Chandra had eight sons by two wives, all of whom were known as A Class Ranas. Two so-called anti-Rana revolutions occurred in 1938 and 1944, and the second of these brought into power what the Nepalese themselves called the B and C Class Ranas. The sons by the kainchi (or secondary) wives of Bhim and Juddha, younger brothers of Chandra, were known as the B Class Ranas. But both Bhim and Juddha had many other children by other women and the sons were known as C Class Ranas. Bhim broke away from the tradition that only A Class Ranas could become Prime Minister or Commander-in-Chief by appointing his sons to high government posts. One of these, Padma, became Commander-in-Chief in 1945 in succession to his uncle Juddha. - Ed., CAR.

MODERN KASHMIR

The first detailed Soviet book on Kashmir, SOVREMENNYY KASHMIR by U.A. Rustamov (Publishing House of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Tashkent), was published in 1960, going beyond an earlier Soviet book on the geography of Kashmir (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1957, No.3, pp.290-4). Though this work is not as long as other recent Soviet handbooks on Persia and Afghanistan (see CAR, 1958, No.3, pp.357-8 and 1961, No.2, pp.206-19), it does examine various aspects of the social, economic, historical and political life of Kashmir, and is of special interest for its treatment of the so-called "Kashmir Question" within the contexts of relations between India and Pakistan.

Following a short introductory section giving general information on Jammu and Kashmir, there is a brief survey of the history of the area, divided into four main periods: the pre-Muslim period, the domination of the Kashmir Muslims, the rule of the Moguls, and the domination of the Afghans. About half of this 20-page section is concerned with the period since the end of the Second World War and Kashmir's position following the partition of India in 1947. This will be considered in greater detail below.

The next section, 10 pages in length, describes the state structure, legal system, administrative divisions and the political parties of Jammu and Kashmir. Rustamov gives the major political parties and social organizations as the National Conference, the Muslim Conference, the Workers' and Peasants' Conference of Jammu and Kashmir, the Socialist Party, the Praja Parishad or Popular Party, the Conference of Kashmir Pandits, the Communist Party, the Akali Party, the Democratic Union and the Democratic National Conference. Of interest and significance is his description of some of the parties. In this, necessarily brief owing to the absence "of detailed information on their programmes and activities", he includes the first five parties named plus the Democratic Union, and conspicuous by its absence is any further mention of the Communist Party. His description of the National Conference clearly indicates that the current Communist policy is to support the National Conference. This is described as having been formed in 1939, and as having "sprung up as a political organization of the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia, and advanced a moderate programme of democratic reforms. Later the programme of the National Conference included some points reflecting the interests of the peasantry and the working-class of Kashmir.

By 1944 the essential part played by the masses in the National Conference had expanded significantly. The Kashmir Communists who had entered its ranks began to play an important role and contributed to its further democratization. In 1945 the National Conference was converted into a mass democratic organization. . ." The Party is associated by the author with such questions as "the ending of the exploitation of man by man, the right to work, an eight-hour working day, equal pay for equal work without distinction of sex and nationality, social insurance, a repeal of private land-ownership, feudal duties, etc." Immediately following the partition of India the National Conference came out for the inclusion of Kashmir within the new Indian Union. Rustamov attacks the Muslim Conference, the ruling Party of Azad Kashmir and the Praja Parishad (Popular Party), but gives a short though favourable review of the Workers' and Peasants' Conference of Jammu and Kashmir as well as of the Socialist Party of Kashmir, which he sees as almost identical in its programme.

The next section of the book is on the population of the country, with information on the nationalities and religions of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. About 30 pages of the book are concerned with the economy of the area. Kashmir is described as a mainly agrarian country, with nearly 90 per cent of the population engaged in agriculture. The book contains much more detail on the agrarian reforms carried out by the National Conference than appeared in the earlier book on the geography of Kashmir. Rustamov says that "the leaders of the National Conference understood that the Government of the Maharajah. . . (and) all the laws of the Government defended the interests of the large landowners, and that the system of land ownership hampered the increase of agricultural production and the improvement of the life of the peasants." As a result, the first step of the present Government was to abolish the system of large land-holdings and improve the position of the tenant peasants. Many peasants were freed from the "feudal yoke", and the 1950 law on agrarian reform liquidated, without any compensation, the large privately-owned land areas. Together with this land reform, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir organized collective farms, the first in the whole country, on the lands which had not been distributed among the peasants. The agrarian reforms carried out in Jammu and Kashmir are described by Rustamov as "the most radical in India", for in the other states of India agrarian reforms stipulated high compensation to the landowners and left a large amount of land in their hands. Mention is made of the formation of cooperative societies, the use of new agricultural techniques, irrigation, etc.

Industrial development is described as being very new. There are not many factories in the area nor enough supplies of energy. Little

has been done to extract the great wealth of raw materials. More than half of all the urban population are occupied in domestic industry, while in rural areas it occupies second place after agriculture. There is a brief description of the working conditions of the artisans of Kashmir, with emphasis on the poverty of the workers and the long working day. Child labour is prevalent. Seventy per cent of the wages of the workers goes on food. However, during the past 10 years the Government has passed measures directed towards the development of artisan production, and the improvement of working and living conditions. The author stresses the value of the creation of industrial cooperative societies, the basic task of which is to free the artisans from "exploitation by traders, middlemen and masters". These industrial cooperative societies give their members long-term loans to buy raw materials and necessary equipment. Only since 1953, according to the author, have steps been taken to repair and build roads and bridges, but since then much such work has been done. There is a description of Kashmir's foreign trade and budget.

The next main section is concerned with the culture of Jammu and Kashmir. There are separate sections on science, literature, music, architecture and education. Although obligatory primary education for boys started in 1929, the increase in schools and trained teachers came only gradually. Much has been done since 1947, and the author gives a favourable description of the present state of education in Kashmir. But he says that this progress does not apply to the area controlled by Pakistan. Other sections include information on public health, sport, and the press and radio in Kashmir.

A final 20-page section is entitled "The Activity of the Imperialists in Kashmir, 1917-57", and much of this overlaps with the earlier section dealing with the history of the area, especially since the partition of India in 1947. In the historical section, the author describes the formation of the National Conference, and his treatment of Sheikh Abdullah recalls the current treatment of Stalin in the Soviet Union: credit is given to Stalin for his activities before 1934, but he is attacked for his subsequent development of the "cult of personality". In the 1930s, according to Rustamov, the national movement of the Kashmir people was headed by the Muslim Conference. The latter was engaged in the abortive uprising of 1931-2 and was led by bourgeois landowner elements. After the uprising was suppressed, the Muslim Conference was divided into two organizations bearing the same name. One of the creators and leaders of the Muslim Conference, Sheikh Abdullah, gradually came under the influence of "progressive leftist circles" and soon realized that the party could not be based on religious principles or solely on a struggle for the rights of Muslims. He decided to create an independent party open both to Muslims and Hindus, and began work among the peasants and artisans. Thus in 1939

there was created the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir, which later began to work under the leadership of the Indian National Congress. This party, according to Rustamov, quickly won the wide support of the masses, who are given credit for heading the "struggle against reaction". During the Second World War "the most progressive figures of the National Conference, in collaboration with the Punjabi Communists", formed a party programme and drafted a future constitution for Kashmir. In May 1946 the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir, "under pressure of the working masses", demanded the removal of the Maharajah, the carrying out of land reforms and the right to self-determination. The Maharajah is accused of having suppressed these demands with arrests and executions.

The British are accused of being interested in the crushing of the liberation movement of the Kashmir people. According to Rustamov, the influence of the National Conference grew as the strongest and most popular organization of the people, and it became identified with the anti-feudal movement. Dissatisfaction with the policy of the Maharajah began to appear in the army and in the landed aristocracy. Then, the author continues, the British proposed to the Maharajah that he should unite with Pakistan after the proposed partition of India. He reports that under the influence of Lord Mountbatten, Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak (earlier said by Rustamov to have been chiefly involved in the suppression of the 1946 uprising), began secret conversations with the leaders of Pakistan on the union of Kashmir with the latter. However, the Maharajah (a Hindu) saw through this, and was not inclined "to give over his principality to Muslim Pakistan". The Maharajah gradually concluded that the most acceptable path for him would be union with India. The leaders of the Indian National Congress persuaded him not to give in to Pakistani threats. The Maharajah was promised that the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir would not incite the people to oppose him. At the same time the leaders of the Congress insisted that the Maharajah free Sheikh Abdullah. In August 1947 the Maharajah replaced Ram Chandra Kak by Mehr Chand Mahadan as Prime Minister, and on 29 September he freed Sheikh Abdullah from prison. Within a fortnight conversations began in Delhi between the deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir and representatives of the Indian Government.

Rustamov says at this point that the British Government was against Kashmir's becoming a part of the new Indian Union. He claims that (1) the British considered the democratic movement in India as being sufficiently strong not to allow the utilization of any part of India as a military base against the Soviet Union, and (2) they were not convinced they could entrust the Indian Government with full control over an area which was so strategically important and which had such an important place in the military plans of the Western powers.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Reproduced from *Sovremennyy Kashmir,* by U. A. Rustamov (Tashkent, 1960)

In addition, the author continues, the Indian Government had still not decided whether they would remain in the Commonwealth. In October 1947, armed bands of mountain tribes from Pakistani territory entered Kashmir, and Sheikh Abdullah, now head of the National Conference, appealed to the Indian Government for aid. (See also CAR, 1957, No.3, pp.287-9.) As compensation for this aid, Kashmir provisionally united with India, and a national plebiscite was proposed for a final solution. Rustamov claims that the British were disturbed about this turn of affairs, and Mountbatten and the commanders of the Armed Forces of India who were in the British service were against granting aid to Kashmir. "However, despite the opposition of the British, the Indian Government granted the request of the National Conference and decided to send its troops into Kashmir. . ." The British and Americans are both accused of having supported measures for removing from Kashmir the northern areas of the country bordering on the USSR and China to form a so-called "Free Kashmir", and of organizing an "international brigade of volunteers" supported by Pakistan as well as the British and Americans. According to the author, however, Lord Mountbatten, after seeing that military preparations in Kashmir were not succeeding, urged the Indian leaders to turn the whole question over to the United Nations. The Soviet writer sees this as an opportunity for the British and Americans to strengthen their own position in Kashmir because of what he calls the "Anglo-American majority" in the Security Council. On 1 January 1948 the Indian Government, "under the pressure of Mountbatten", appealed to the Security Council with a request to tell Pakistan to end her aid to the tribes invading Kashmir and to recall Pakistani citizens involved in the fighting. A year later India and Pakistan ended military action in Kashmir. In July 1949, in accordance with a Security Council resolution of 13 August 1948, a cease-fire line was established, dividing Kashmir into two parts: Jammu and Kashmir on one side, and "Independent Kashmir", including the northern and western areas of the principality, on the other. Rustamov says that Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders of Kashmir had become involved with "the intrigues of the imperialists" and had come out in support of the plan for the creation of an "Independent Kashmir", the security of which would be "guaranteed" by Britain, the USA and some other Western powers.

At the same time the author notes that the Government of the National Conference, coming to power in October 1947, had worked out a series of democratic reforms, including agrarian reform, a reduction of rent payments, postponement in the collection of debts, etc. In 1950 the National Conference called for the convening of a constituent assembly of Kashmir, and elections took place in September 1951, "removing from power the hated Maharajah". In August 1952 the Constituent Assembly ratified the Delhi agreement signed on 24 July between representatives of India and Kashmir determining the status

and rights of Kashmir within the Indian Union. Kashmir was given the right to regulate questions of property within her territory, to fly her state flag alongside that of India, to elect her president instead of having an appointed governor, while at the same time she accepted the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India.

Sheikh Abdullah is accused of not acting up to his words and commitments. Reforms were scanty and not carried through to the end. His Government became "all the more distant from the people, [and he] even became a champion of the policy of the imperialist powers and came out against the entrance of Kashmir into the Indian Union." He is quoted as having demanded sovereign powers for the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, without any limitation of its rights by the Constitution of the Indian Union. In August 1953 he was arrested, and the new Government and the Constituent Assembly in February 1954 approved the union of Kashmir with India. A description is given of the rights retained by Kashmir and of those which were subordinated to the central Indian government. In November 1956 the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir accepted the Constitution, and in two months it dissolved itself, following which elections were held for a new Legislative Assembly. Thus, according to the author, "the question of Kashmir was decided de facto and de jure by the Kashmir people themselves. . ."

The last chapter in the book, "The Activity of the Imperialists in Kashmir, 1917-57", returns to the events after the Second World War. From certain additions and repetitions it would appear that it was written after the completion of the original book. In this chapter the Americans are accused of having taken over from the British the responsibility for the "intrigues" in this area. They started by sending the chairman of the National Society of American Photographers to Kashmir in August 1946 under the auspices of the American National Geographic Society, which, "as is known. . . was closely linked with the work of the intelligence organs of the American Ministry of Defence . . ." (sic). All the subsequent events are seen in the light of alleged American efforts at espionage and the establishment of Kashmir as a military base directed against the USSR and China. American tourists are accused of having tried to change the foreign policy orientation of Kashmir. Even the "American Church" is accused of having replaced the "British Church" in carrying out subversive activities. The Moral Rearmament group under Frank Buchman is accused of having direct links with Washington. This section ends with a number of accounts of British and American "intrigues", many of them taken from Rajpori and Kaul's CONSPIRACY IN KASHMIR. The following is an example (p.117): "Philip Martin Edmonds, a former member of the British Intelligence Corps, arrived in Kashmir at the end of 1948 as headmaster of the Anglican Mission School at Sheikh Bagh (Srinagar). Officially

he was supposed to be concerned with the education of Christian children in Kashmir, but in fact he was a participant in and the organizer of many political intrigues in Kashmir. In particular, Edmonds widely propagated pro-Pakistan ideas among those attending his school. At the time of the national liberation revolt in Kashmir and the intervention of Pakistan troops and tribal militia, he organized a special kind of psychological campaign against the union of Kashmir with India."

There follows a six-page final section headed "The Kashmir Question", which is seen as a creation of the British and Americans and as an excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of India. The author repeats much of what he had already said about the events of 1947 and 1948, but he now blames Britain and the USA rather than Pakistan for encouraging emnity between Pakistan and India. Apparently for the first time in Soviet publications, details are given of the plebiscite proposed for the area and of the role of the United Nations in trying to bring it about. The Security Council on 20 January 1948 appointed a "Commission on the Kashmir Problem". This was supposed to achieve a cease-fire, supervise the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops and prepare for the conduct of a plebiscite in Kashmir. The Commission negotiated with the two Governments, and the Secretary General of the United Nations was to appoint an administrator to supervise the plebiscite, though this was seen by the author as an attempt "to legalize the crude interference of American imperialists in the internal affairs of Jammu and Kashmir." The appointment of the American Admiral Nimitz as superviser was seen as an American assumption of wide powers in Kashmir. But, says the author, Pakistan had not abided by her agreement to refrain from increasing her military potential in Jammu and Kashmir, and had instead increased her military penetration and created military bases in Kashmir. (A Russian source is quoted for this information.) Pakistan is also accused of having propagated the idea of a "holy war" over the "Kashmir Question". In addition, Pakistan did not remove her troops from the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The United Nations Commission thus ended in failure, and it left open the question of the future status of the northern areas of the country. In 1949 the United Nations sent a group of military observers to Kashmir who stationed themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line. Rustamov accuses them of having been dominated by American agents who were trying to incite the people to demand a free plebiscite, and in case of the failure of this demand, to come out for a "Free Kashmir", promising American and United Nations aid if Kashmir received her independence. Most of the observers, according to the author, were prejudiced against the Indian position. Rustamov accuses the Americans of deliberately keeping the Kashmir question alive in the United Nations, and says that the decisions reached by the UN do not reflect the will of the peoples of Jammu and

Kashmir. He says that the people have already solved the whole question of Kashmir, "having expressed their wish to enter the Indian Union". Khrushchev is quoted as having declared his conviction that the question has been definitively solved, and the text of some of his speeches, and those of Kashmir leaders, as well as United Nations resolutions, are given as a supplement. An interesting feature of this last section is that the author avoids committing himself on any possibility of a future plebiscite on the determination of the future status of Kashmir on the apparent assumption that its union with India has solved the question. At the same time he tries to avoid antagonizing Pakistan by placing the blame for the hostility between Pakistan and India on the Americans.

THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

The following is an abridged version of a report of the Sixth Congress of the Indian Communist Party, which appeared in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN', No.10 of 1960.

* * *

In April 1960 the Indian Communist Party held its Sixth Congress in Vijayawada, in the state of Andhra. The 456 delegates were from 16 states and five territories of India, 120 of them being members of various legislative and administrative organs of the country, including 12 deputies of the central parliament, 56 deputies of legislative assemblies of the states and 14 members of municipal governments.

M.A. Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union headed the delegation from the USSR. Delegations from Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy and Australia were also present. Suslov, in his address to the Congress, stressed "the successes of the Soviet people on the road to the building of socialism and communism" and brought as a gift to the Congress a portrait of Lenin by the Soviet artist Vasil'yev.

Ajoy Ghosh, General Secretary of the Indian Communist Party presented a report on the political situation in the country. He said that since the new programme of the Indian Communist Party was passed in 1951 many important events had occurred in the world and in the country that demanded a new evaluation on the part of the Party. According to Ghosh the programme, although it contained many correct statements, had at the same time lost sight of some important factors in the new situation. Among these he included "the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and imperialism; the role which must be played by the desire of the masses for the strengthening and consolidation of national independence and the national economy; and the enormous and decisive significance of the rise of the worldwide system of socialism and its influence on the progress of events in India." Ghosh noted that the programme also contained oversimplified, one-sided formulae

according to which the Government was described as "pro-imperialist" (sic), for which reason no progress in the country was possible. The Fourth Congress of the Indian Communist Party in 1956 had clearly pointed to the dual role of the national bourgeoisie. Not underestimating the readiness of the bourgeoisie to compromise, the Congress at that time had paid attention to the growth of "conflicts and contradictions" between imperialism and feudalism on the one hand, and the needs for the economic development of India on the other. This "was reflected in the strengthening of conflicts and contradictions between the Indian Government and imperialism".

Since then, Ghosh continued, these contradictions had intensified. The aggravation of the contradictions between imperialism and the whole Indian people, including the national bourgeoisie, had helped to make Indian independence rest on a more solid foundation than before, that is, by increasing economic links with the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc. However, Indian economic development had not kept up with the needs of the people. Steel production was not enough to provide the barest needs of the country. Although the state element had become an important factor in the economy, monopolies had been growing at the same time; this had led to a concentration of economic power in the hands of the big magnates, and strengthened the links between the Indian bourgeoisie and foreign capital.

In speaking of agrarian reforms, Ghosh maintained that though feudal relations have been limited, the landowners have preserved their positions, and as a result agriculture, in which more than 70 per cent of the population are engaged, remains in a state of semi-stagnation. Indian workers are described as living in conditions of poverty and deprivation, and though their productive labour has grown in the past few years, the standard of living remains at the 1939 level, mainly because of the steady rise in prices. The Communist Party, according to Ghosh, supports the goals of the five-year plans directed towards the industrialization of the country, but is against allowing it to be carried out at the expense of the masses.

Ghosh admitted that the Communist Party still had much to do before it became a decisive factor in the political life of the country, although they had received more than 12,000,000 votes in the 1957 general elections. In speaking of their temporary success in the state of Kerala, Ghosh claimed that its activities had been limited by being within the framework of a bourgeois constitution without effective control over the organs of state power. He maintained that all the reactionary and opposition forces united against the Kerala Government, and the dissolution of this Government headed by the Communists in July 1959, was realized "in violation of the principles of the Indian Constitution and bore witness to the strength of the influence of

reactionary forces in the country and within the ruling party, the Indian National Congress". However, he also claimed that many members of the Indian National Congress wanted to counteract what he calls "the trend to the right" in India.

At the end of his speech Ghosh called for the creation of a national democratic front to include, besides the working-class and peasantry, those parts of the national bourgeoisie which "are interested in the development of the country along the road of economic and social progress". He felt that many members of the Indian National Congress would join such a movement.

No mention was made in this article of China, or of India's border dispute with her. Mention was made for the need to overcome "serious ideological and organizational weaknesses in the Party" and the need, among other things, for "strict observance of discipline". The only note made of frequent reports in the Western press of dissensions within the Indian Communist Party was a mention of what Ghosh called "fabrications", saying that "some even predicted a split in the Party". He claimed that if there were any differences in opinions, "these were pushed into the background in the general interest and to promote the general purpose of all the participants of the Congress . . ."

INDIA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST BLOC

In a recent article entitled "India's Economic Relations with the Socialist Countries" (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No.11, 1960, pp.98-105) V. Kondrat'yev reviews India's growing economic links with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist bloc. In doing this, he aims at comparing the latter countries' motives as favourably as possible with those of the Western bloc, claiming that the most important weapon of the "new colonial policy" of the "imperialist powers", following the granting of independence to the underdeveloped countries, was the inclusion of these countries in a "network of one-sided 'aid', linked with political and military conditions".

Kondrat'yev briefly reviews the first years after India attained her independence, asserting that at first the Indian bourgeoisie counted on real aid in the economic development of the country, especially in industrialization, from the Western powers, particularly the United States and Britain. But he claims that the industrialization of underdeveloped countries was not advantageous to "imperialist monopolies", which sought to keep these countries as economic appendages to the world-wide capitalist system. Because of this India embarked on trade and economic relations with the countries of the socialist system.

The first significant manifestation of this new policy was the conclusion on 2 December 1953 of a five-year Indian-Soviet trade agreement. The author quotes an Indian journalist, N. Chakravarti, as saying that unlike the "imperialist powers", the Soviet Union does not give India goods she does not need, in the guise of trade, but rather offers steel, equipment for developing the oil and mining industries, and other things necessary for India's industrial development. In return, the journalist is further quoted, the Soviet Union offers to buy raw materials and industrial manufactured articles from India, creating new markets for "those same goods which for a long time we were forced to sell to the imperialists, who dictated conditions to us".

A new agreement was signed in Moscow on 16 November 1958, providing for the further expansion of trade between India and the USSR in the ensuing five years. Trade agreements were also signed between

India and the other socialist countries. The author stresses that the treaties provide for long-term agreements of from three to five years, and for mutually advantageous exchanges. The trade turnover of India with the socialist countries from 1953 to 1959 is summarized in the following table, reproduced from the article:

Indian Trade with the Socialist Countries*

(in millions of rupees)

Countries	1953			1954			1958			1959		
	Exports	Imports	Turnover	Exports	Imports	Turnover	Exports	Imports	Turnover	Exports	Imports	Turnover
USSR	3.6	4.5	8.1	25.1	11.3	36.4	233.2	217.1	450.3	303.6	166.5	470.1
China	12.1	10.8	22.9	18.0	15.3	33.3	34.2	52.8	87.0	78.2	48.6	126.8
Czecho-slovakia	27.5	12.8	40.3	20.8	13.3	34.1	39.3	64.8	104.1	42.4	37.2	79.6
Poland	0.9	1.7	2.6	2.7	26.0	28.7	9.2	22.6	31.8	35.9	40.2	76.1
(East) Germany	0.1	1.1	1.2	0.2	1.9	2.1	7.2	10.9	18.1	25.0	31.4	56.4
Hungary	0.3	1.0	1.3	2.0	0.9	2.9	6.1	6.2	12.3	7.3	23.9	31.2
Rumania	0.2	-	0.2	0.3	2.0	2.3	5.2	4.0	9.2	20.2	13.2	33.4
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	0.7	1.4	2.4	2.5	4.9
Total	44.7	31.9	76.6	69.1	70.7	139.8	335.1	379.1	714.2	515.0	363.5	878.5

* Not including North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia and Albania, with whom trade has been negligible.

From 1953 to 1959 the volume of trade between India and the socialist countries as a whole increased twelve times (58 times with the USSR, 29 with Poland, 5.5 with China and double with Czechoslovakia). Figures of this sort must, however, be interpreted with care, considering the originally very low volume of trade. In 1959 the Soviet Union occupied fifth place in India's general trade turnover, fourth in exports and tenth in imports. According to the author, the trade turnover of India with the socialist countries increased 22.8 per cent from 1958 to 1959, compared with only a 2.2 per cent increase in trade with the capitalist countries. He quotes THE TIMES OF INDIA (23.2.59) as explaining the latter figure as being caused "chiefly by a slump in prices on the world market in the traditional goods exported by India and a decrease in demand as a result of the slump". Kondrat'yev says that at least three-quarters of all goods offered by the socialist countries for export to India are intended directly for industrial development and an increase in the technical level of the Indian economy. The socialist countries import textiles and other industrial raw materials, tea, spices and some manufactured goods from India.

The West European countries are blamed for India's unfavourable trade balance, which has grown from 1,810 million rupees in 1948 to 2,646 million in 1959 in excess of imports over exports. Trade with the socialist countries, according to the author, has tended to reduce the seriousness of this imbalance.

Much emphasis is laid on Soviet help in capital construction and the development of Indian heavy industry, especially the Bhilai Metallurgical Plant designed by the Russians and now playing an important part in Indian industry. Details are given of further Soviet plans to build factories in India in the next few years, and to help India develop her natural resources and establish her industry on a firm basis. The author claims that the aid of the socialist countries is without ulterior motive, and that they do not seek participation in the management of those enterprises in whose construction they play a role. Future plans also include help in studying India's mineral raw materials, especially coal and non-ferrous metals, and in their future extraction. Indian specialists are being trained in the Soviet Union in new ways of extracting oil, and Soviet specialists are being sent to India.

Mention is also made in this article of Soviet help in the development of India's agriculture, and of efforts being made to develop the training of technical native personnel, including engineers, in the use of Soviet equipment.

Finally, the author emphasizes that the coordination of the aid of the various countries of the Soviet bloc conserves India's foreign currency reserves, thus greatly assisting her world-wide trade. In August 1960 an agreement was reached by which the USSR, at the request of the Indian Government, expressed her readiness to grant India an additional credit of 500 million rupees for the completion of India's third Five-Year Plan. According to Kondrat'yev, the major part of Russian credits charge interest at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent, which he says compares very favourably with Western offers.

AFGHANISTAN'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

In her book on the history and present status of Afghanistan's educational system (PROSVESHCHENIYE V NEZAVISIMOM AFGANISTANE, Moscow, 1960), T.I. Kukhtina reviews the progress of education in Afghanistan in a comparatively favourable light. The same author contributed a ten-page section on the same subject in a recent comprehensive Soviet book on Afghanistan, already reviewed in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW (1961, No.2, p.208). It is of particular interest to compare the present work with Doroshenko's recent book on Persia's educational system (see CAR, 1961, No.3, pp.297-301). Both books reflect current Soviet attitudes towards these countries, and this becomes more marked when one considers that the State and systems of education in both countries have much in common. In both, 85-90 per cent of the population are illiterate; in both the influence of Islam and the clergy has been and still is, to a greater or lesser extent, an important factor in the educational system; and in both Western aid has been considerable and Western influence noticeable in the development of educational institutions. However, the Soviet Union has been making great efforts to maintain close and friendly relations with Afghanistan, while her attitude towards Persia is considerably more critical. As a result, the present book on Afghanistan stresses the progress made in recent years, with a less exaggerated assessment of the role of Muslim schools, and favourable comment on the fact that the level of literacy has now reached 12-13 per cent of the adult population. In the case of Persia, the role of the Muslim clergy was severely criticized, and although the same increase in literacy has been attained, the emphasis is all on the fact that 85-90 per cent of the population are still illiterate. Kukhtina uses mainly Russian, British, American and United Nations sources, including international year-books on education. A bibliography is included in the book, as well as a number of charts listing the various types of schools in Afghanistan, the number of students, the number graduating from Afghan schools, the distribution of population, schools, students and teachers by provinces, and charts showing the structure of the Ministry of Education and of Kabul University.

The first part of the book reviews the history of Afghan education, attributing the extreme backwardness of the country partly to the British, and partly to Muslim control of education and to the shortage of literate teachers. It is interesting to note that the author acknowledges that progress was made even after Afghanistan's foreign

policy came under British control, following the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). Reforms under the Amir Abdurrahman (1880-1901) were directed towards the creation of a centralized state, the ordering of her finances, the assurance of favourable conditions for the development of trade and handicrafts and against the penetration of foreign capital. The rights of the Muslim clergy were limited, though the clergy "continued to play a role in the political life of the country". According to Kukhtina, the next Amir, Habibullah (1901-19), was forced by British pressure to remove restrictions on the activity of foreign merchants, which led to a forced increase in the importation of British goods and thus to the reduction of Afghan economic and cultural development. The struggle for independence in Afghanistan and the introduction of a new Constitution are credited to the Young Afghan movement, which united the landowners and formed ties with traders, merchants and progressive representatives of the intelligentsia, army officer and official groups. This combination is welcomed by the author, for "in spite of the fact that the Young Afghans united a narrow circle of bourgeois-landowning nationalists, their programme coincided favourably with the interests of the broad masses of the country's population. . ." They were helped by the fact that "the reactionary clergy and part of the tribal nobility" were also in opposition to the Amir. This movement of the Young Afghans for independence and the carrying out of bourgeois reforms is seen as having fundamentally determined the whole internal political background in the country, affecting as it did the development of education and progressive ideas.

In 1911 a Department of Education was opened, consisting of 10 members, including both Afghan specialists and Indian and Turkish experts in the service of the Afghan Government. They met twice a week to work out the principles which were to govern education, the establishment of primary and middle schools, the content of the courses and exams to be given, etc. The Department used the aid of private individuals in opening some primary schools. However, the schools were "in the hands of the clergy", and did not, according to the author, do much more than teach a limited number of children how to read and write.

Following the establishment of Afghan independence in 1919, reforms were undertaken by the Government to hasten the development of capitalist relationships, and this is seen as having promoted the growth of education. Education was taken out of the control of the Muslim clergy and entrusted to the State. A system of secular education (primary, middle, professional and women's schools) was established. Some steps were taken to train Afghans abroad in order to gain the higher educational standards needed for the development of the country. However, in 1928-9 there was a reaction against these reforms, and all

secular schools were closed, with education again coming under the control of the Muslim clergy.

The development of Afghan education in the 1930s was linked with measures by the Government directed towards providing all branches of the country's national economy with native trained personnel and specialists, and towards the raising of the literacy of the population. In 1938 the Ministry of Education reorganized its central apparatus. Primary schools which had been closed because of a shortage of teachers were reopened; the teaching of Pushtu was increased; steps were taken for a more thorough study of the geography, history and literature of Afghanistan; and more Afghans were sent to foreign universities. The number of schools increased from 22 in 1932 to 312 in 1939; the number of teachers from 105 to 1,507 and the number of pupils from 1,350 to 50,000.

The Second World War had an unfavourable effect on the progress of education in Afghanistan. Although the number of teachers did not decrease, their professional training worsened. The Afghan Government had to go abroad not only for engineers and technicians, but also for skilled workers, including teachers. In 1944 a Faculty of Humanities opened in Kabul whose task was to prepare teachers for teacher-training schools and lycées. In 1946 Kabul University was opened, and an increase followed in the number of Afghan teachers, who soon almost completely replaced foreign teachers in middle schools (except in courses concerned with the teaching of foreign languages). But from 1946 to 1950 there was a decrease in the number of schools, mainly owing to insufficient funds and a shortage of teachers. The decrease was chiefly in the number of primary schools, partly because during the war the Ministry of Education paid special attention to the development of middle, professional and higher education. In the first post-war years middle professional and higher education was strengthened by the penetration of Western, particularly American, specialists. This is seen by the author as part of a scheme for "ideological expansion by American imperialism". Mention is made of the contribution by specialized organizations of the United Nations, though these too are considered by Kukhtina as being under American influence. Kabul University, with its faculties of Medicine, juridical and political science, humanities and natural sciences maintains links with seven American universities, three British universities (Cambridge, Oxford and London) and the University of Paris.

In her treatment of recent developments in Afghan education, Kukhtina mentions aid given by the Soviet Union, though this is mainly in economic spheres. The Soviet Union is also credited with training Afghans in the use of Soviet equipment, instruction being carried out in Persian and Pushtu with the aid of translators. It is acknowledged,

however, that America has had considerable influence on the development of Afghanistan's educational system. After the usual attack on American motives in seeking to exert their economic and political influence, especially on the youth of the country, the author gives an unusually straightforward account of exchange programmes between Afghanistan and America, and American provision of professional and technical aid. Favourable comment is also given on UNESCO's help to Afghanistan, especially in improving methods of teaching, working out study aids, and organizing courses and creating schools for the training of teachers. There is also mention of cultural links between Afghanistan and America, West Germany, France and Britain. Considerable data is provided on the Afghan Government's plans for increasing the quantity and quality of Afghan schools. The Five-Year Plan of Afghanistan for 1956-61 provides for the opening of 160 new urban and 500 rural primary schools, as well as for increased training of Afghan teachers to meet this rapid growth.

The final chapter of this book gives a detailed analysis of the present-day educational system in Afghanistan, and this is treated quite objectively. The author indirectly criticizes the continued existence of religious disciplines in the schools, but at the same time comments on the introduction of contemporary methods of study in the educational system. Study is free, with obligatory primary education. Twenty per cent of the budget of the Ministry of Education is allotted towards primary education, though this is still not enough to ensure the liquidation of illiteracy. As a rule, only one child out of fifteen finishes his course of studies in the urban primary school and this constitutes a serious problem. The course in rural primary schools usually lasts three years. Apparently each year has one textbook, giving elementary data on religious dogma, reading and writing, and basic knowledge about nature. Those completing the course in the rural primary school are entitled to enter the urban primary school, which has a six-year course, including study of the Koran, Persian, Pushtu, arithmetic, history, geography, calligraphy, drawing, handicrafts and physical culture. The author says that "all teaching of the humanities is permeated by the spirit of loyalty to the reigning dynasty and Islam. . .", but in general criticism of the influence of Islam is very much more subdued than in the book on Persian education.

In the 1958-9 school year, there were 465 rural primary schools, with 23,949 pupils, including 224 girls. There were 338 urban primary schools, with 117,370 pupils, including 12,022 girls. The presentation of these figures in this form is evidently intended as an indirect criticism of the lack of opportunities for girls in Afghanistan to receive a primary education.

According to Kukhtina, the only middle schools in Afghanistan are in Kabul and the other large cities. The programme of these schools, as stressed by the Ministry of Education, is to give pupils the material necessary to fulfil moral, religious and patriotic duties, and to give students the opportunity to choose their profession and determine their place in the life of the country. In 1958-9 there were 29 middle schools, with 7,973 pupils, including 1,726 girls. Professional education in Afghanistan has developed mainly over the past 20 years. The author acknowledges that most of this is due to help by specialized organs of the United Nations and the United States. In 1958-9 there were 27 professional institutions, with 4,427 students. They provided education in technology, mechanics, industry, agriculture, commerce and other fields, and are helping to overcome the great shortage of trained teachers.

The only university in Afghanistan is Kabul University, which combines a number of faculties and institutes, some of which were founded before the creation of the University itself: Medical (1932), Juridical and Political Science (1938), Natural Sciences (1942), Humanities (1945), Women's Faculty (1948), Theological (1950), Pedagogic (1954), Engineering and Agricultural (1956) and Economic (1957). In 1959-60 there were 1,503 students at the University, with a teaching staff of 151. The University is directed by a Rector, who has the right to decide all organizational questions. He is directly subordinate to the Minister of Education administratively, and is elected from among the deans and professors of the various faculties, his appointment being confirmed by the King. The Rector and deans of the faculties are elected for three years. Considerable detail is provided on the course of study in each of the several faculties of the University.

The author says without comment that religious teaching is obligatory in all educational establishments in Afghanistan, 99 per cent of whose population are Muslims. In some schools, besides the teaching of theology and the Koran, there are also courses in Muslim law and the history of Islam. Two pages of information, mainly statistical, are provided on the types of religious schools, and this is given without any comment.

Mention is made of the fact that the children of a considerable number of workers, especially in rural areas, often do not go to school because they have to help their families to provide for food. However, on the whole criticism of this type is very mild, especially when compared with comments on the same subject in Doroshenko's book on Persian education. The author seeks to credit the Afghan Government with doing all it can to improve the situation. She mentions that though only six per cent of the Afghan budget is directly assigned for education purposes, other ministries and offices also make contributions, and this totals nearly 16 per cent of the entire budget.

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries, appearing in Soviet newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 July - 30 September 1961. The only items on India which have been included are those relating to the Indian Communist Party and to the general subject of Soviet-Indian relations. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

AFGHANISTAN

The telegrams exchanged between Khrushchev and Muhammad Daud, the Afghan Prime Minister on 1 July, which marked the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression, were published in full in PR, and described in brief in TRUD, KZ, and PV. PR also described briefly telegrams on the same subject exchanged between the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Gromyko.

On 1.7.61 IZ reported the Afghan Prime Minister as stating at a press conference held in London on 29 June that so far there was no prospect of any aid by Britain to Afghanistan in the carrying out of the five-year plan. The Prime Minister is reported to have said at the same conference that Afghanistan's relations with the USSR were of the most friendly and cordial description. PR, IZ and PV reported a meeting between the King and the Soviet experts working on the motor-road through the Salang Pass. "The enthusiasm of the Soviet experts", the King is quoted as saying, "is an inspiration to the Afghans working side by side with them and acquiring the valuable technical knowledge and experience so necessary for raising the economy of Afghanistan."

Sporting exchanges (football, volley-ball, and wrestling) between Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and Afghanistan are reported in TI of 7.7.61 and 8.7.61, in PV of 23 and 31 August and in SK of 20 June.

Only brief although laudatory references were made in PR, IZ, BR and KT to Afghan Independence Day (23 August), the last-named newspaper

wrongly referring to this as the Afghan National Fête, which was held on the 27 May. A good deal more attention was paid to the Soviet pavilion at the International Exhibition the opening of which coincided with Independence Day. Considerable prominence was given to the King's complimentary remarks during his visit to the pavilion.

About one-third of a long article called "The Atlantic Generals Prepare 'a Trial of Strength'" by "Observer" in KZ of 15 September is devoted to the "ominous shadow" which CENTO is said to be casting over Afghanistan. Acting under the inspiration of the Pentagon, CENTO is encouraging the Pakistan Government in its provocation against Afghanistan. Much emphasis is laid on the reported use of American arms by the Pakistan Army in its frontier operations. In another brief article on the same subject in IZ of 9 September, K. Smirnov repeats the statement that it would be a serious mistake on the part of CENTO to think that the Soviet Union will remain indifferent to this alleged provocation.

Extensive coverage was given by the metropolitan and Central Asian press to the visit in September to Moscow by the Afghan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In an article in PR of 26 September, V. Nikolayev described the work proceeding on the hydroelectric station at Naglu 70 km. from Kabul. This project is being carried out under Soviet supervision and the author describes the delight which Afghans take in learning various techniques under Soviet instructors. "Any Afghan will tell you", he writes, "that the local workers do not display any such desire to be trained by American or West German experts and strange to relate, in the projects controlled by American and West German engineers, they literally entice and place the highest value on Afghans trained by our experts."

INDIA

PV of 25 June reported briefly a meeting of the Plenum of the Indian Communist Party in Bangalore which considered among other things the Party's pre-election manifesto in connection with the forthcoming elections in the spring of 1962. PR of 20 September reported a plenum meeting on 18 September at which the Secretary General, Ajoy Ghosh approved the decision of the Soviet Government to resume nuclear tests.

BR of 15 August carried a short article called USSR-India by Dzh. Aliyev written after a short tour of India. Most of the article consists of conventional descriptions of progress stimulated by Soviet aid. Mention is made of the success achieved by Soviet and Rumanian experts

in prospecting for oil in the Bombay and Panjab states. The author claims that the first signs of the presence of oil were noted in the second half of the last century, but that the "colonizers" decided to refuse access to these riches, although the Western oil companies' profits were enough to have equipped two enterprises capable of producing four million tons of oil per year.

NEPAL

The opening of a Nepalese Embassy in Moscow on the fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Nepal was acclaimed by the Soviet Press. In an article in IZ of 21 July, G. Zhakov explains that the isolation of Nepal from the rest of the world up to 1951 resulted from barriers created not only by geography, but by the imperialist powers. These latter barriers disappeared with the abolition of the Nepalese regime "of feudal circles with pro-British tendencies". The article speaks approvingly of Nepal's present neutral attitude and of the bright prospects held out by close relations between Nepal and the USSR.

IZ on 30 September reported briefly and without comment the visit of the King and Queen of Nepal to the Chinese People's Republic.

PAKISTAN

Highly unfavourable comment on President Ayub Khan's visit to the USA in July was contained in PR, IZ and TI. Mr. Nehru's criticism of President Ayub Khan's statements were reported with approval in IZ of 21 July. A TASS message from Delhi dated 27 July reported that in addition to the air bases in Gilgit, Chilaz and Skardu, a new base had been created at Bagh in the Uri region and that the Pakistan air personnel at all these bases were "under the control" of American military advisers, for whom settlements had been created in Sialkot, Jhelum, Kasura and Rawalpindi.

The Soviet press (IZ of 9 September, PR of 8 September and SK and KP of 9 September) placed the responsibility for the rupture of diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan firmly on the latter. Commenting on the Pakistan "White Book", IZ claims to detect signs of "a miraculous plan" concocted by CENTO for the division of Afghanistan between Pakistan and Persia.

TI of 5 July reports the signature of contracts in Karachi for the sending of Soviet equipment and specialists to Pakistan under the technical agreement for the prospecting of oil signed on 4 March 1961.

PERSIA

Discontent among the peasants and the inadequacy of the new agrarian reform legislation were the subject of an article in KT (20.7.61) by D. Kasatkin. Under the agrarian reform law passed in March, said Kasatkin, the size of land holdings was limited; but landowners could either, by paying "an insignificant tax", keep all their excess acreage in their own hands, or sell it to the State at an agreed price. The landlord could of course prolong the ensuing price negotiations indefinitely, meanwhile avoiding any payment of the land tax. The basic problem of large landownership was untouched by the law, which was only designed to give the peasants a false impression that reforms were in progress, and thereby to distract their attention from the struggle for a genuine agrarian reform.

Persian newspaper articles calling for a neutral foreign policy and Persia's withdrawal from CENTO were widely quoted by Soviet commentators. Thus, according to BR (23.6.61), PEYGHAME EMRUZ had stated that "the time has come to ask the Foreign Ministry to relegate the CENTO Pact to the archives for good"; SEDAYE MARDOM had said that "Persia is on the eve of an explosion. . . against the insolent and unscrupulous foreigners who are plundering our country"; ERADZE AZERBAYDZHAN had said that Persia should seek to build up a sound national economy by seeking the assistance of the countries which were building India's Bhilai steelworks, Egypt's High Dam, etc.; and DUNYSYE JADID, addressing the Americans, had said that Persia had reached the limit of its patience with the appalling economic situation, "which can only be restored to normal by your departure". These and similar statements were also quoted in an article by A. Arababzhyan, calling for a neutral policy for Persia (KP. 5.7.61; BK. 7.7.61; KT. 15.7.61).

IZ (27.7.61) published a three-column article, signed "Observer", which gave an account of the suppression of the National Front demonstrations of 21 July in Tehran, and indignantly denied Persian allegations that Soviet incitement was partly to blame for the demonstrations. The following are some extracts from the article.

[On army and police action against the demonstrators.] "This action was planned in advance and carried out in cold blood. Its purpose was to frighten the people of Persia, who are intensifying their struggle to bring their country back on to the way of an independent policy, the way of liberation from the fetters of economic and political dependence on foreigners. . . On the boulevard near the racecourse by 6 o'clock, in spite of the police, there were between 5,000 and 6,000 people. They came to express their urgent demands, in particular the

demand for elections to the Majlis, which is stubbornly opposed by the rulers of Persia. Truncheons and rifle-butts were used by the police against the peaceful demonstrators, causing clashes. The police called on the troops for help. . . There were many arrests. One need only add that the Shah and Premier Amini were fully in touch with the events. . . and that those leading the operations against the demonstrators were in constant radio and telephone communication with them. They both, by the way, categorically demanded pitiless brutality against the people."

[On Persian complaints of Soviet interference.] "Some Persian papers launched a venomous anti-Soviet campaign, accusing the Soviet Government of. . . inciting the people to revolt and disturbances. . . They claimed that on 21 July, Moscow radio had been giving out instructions all day telling people to start disturbances and start a revolution. . . One can reply to these provocative statements in the words of an eastern proverb: There is apparently not a drop left in the jar of Mr. Amini's sense. The only thing coming from this jar is the stinking smell of decay, which has long poisoned the atmosphere of Soviet-Persian relations. . . As far as the Moscow broadcasts of 21 July are concerned, of course they contained no calls for the people of Persia to start a revolt or disturbances. But these broadcasts gave the truth about Persia, the truth about the pillaging of the Persian people by foreign plunderers who are given a free hand, with Amini's blessing. . . No, Mr. Amini, your cheap tricks will not deceive even the most gullible Tehran bazaar-dweller. It is not difficult to see that this gross anti-Soviet provocation was launched by the Persian Government to avoid responsibility for the disgraceful atrocities against peaceful people on 21 July and to strengthen the military and police regime in Persia."

[On Soviet-Persian relations.] "According to the foreign press, Amini, on the Shah's instructions, called on the US Ambassador on the eve of these events in Tehran and conferred with him on means to put down the peaceful demonstration and organize an anti-Soviet hue and cry. The plans are clear: the USA is trying to push the Persian ruling circles into worsening Persia's relations with the Soviet Union, so as to complicate the situation on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to such provocations launched to the detriment of peace and security in the Middle East. The responsibility for the events of 21 July rests wholly and completely with the Persian Government. As for the Persian people, the Soviet people entertain the best of feelings for them. The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize Persia's equality and to scrap the enslaving treaties which humiliated the national dignity of Persians. The Soviet Union has always remained loyal to the good neighbour policy."

As might be expected, Soviet newspapers gave new emphasis to the theme of Persian popular demand for neutrality and withdrawal from CENTO, in the light of the "CENTO secret documents". KZ (24.8.61) said that the Persian people were calling the policy of Western military alliances hostile to the Soviet Union "a policy of suicide". The "mortal danger" of participation in CENTO had been made even clearer to them by the CENTO documents.

TASS dispatches from Tehran reported (IZ. 29.8.61) a strike by sugar factory workers in Birjand demanding proper labour protection measures; (BR. 3.8.61) clashes between gendarmes and peasants demanding fairer treatment by landlords; and (IZ. 7.9.61) protests by trade unionists against high rents.

During the second half of September the metropolitan press (PR, IZ, KZ and TRUD) gave extensive coverage to the defection to the Soviet Union of Major Mortazavi, an officer of the Persian Army. In a long statement over his signature published in PR and KZ, Mortazavi gave as his reasons for asking for asylum in the USSR the knowledge he gained during a visit to the USA of American intentions towards Persia, the revelations of alleged CENTO plans for the devastation of his country in the event of war, and the conviction that the Shah was mainly responsible "for all the ills of the poor and credulous Persian people". In the statement Mortazavi disclaimed any knowledge of Communist theories, but spoke of his admiration for the achievements of the "socialist countries" in raising the living standards of their peoples.

The Incident was reported much more briefly in KP, KT, PV and TI.

TIBET

KT of 14 July carries an article by Yu. Gavrilov, TASS correspondent in Peking, entitled "Tibetan Virgin Soil". This article, apparently based on a recent visit although it does not say so, paints an extremely favourable picture of present-day conditions in Tibet and ascribes the progress made "to the cooperation and great help given by the Central Government of the Chinese People's Republic." Among the achievements listed are the amalgamation of over a hundred thousand farmsteads into "mutual help labour brigades", the building of a 1,400 km. railway from Sinin to Lhasa, the opening of 1,500 schools where none existed before "the liberation of Tibet", and the opening of a number of technical training establishments. Six hundred Tibetan young men and girls are being trained in the "Central Institute of National Minorities". "After these initial successes", the article ends, "the Tibetan people is firmly resolved to increase its efforts in the building of a new life."

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAYDZHAN

100 0 100 200 300 km.

Chelyabinsk
Ufa
Troitsk
Magnitogorsk
Kartaly
Tobol
Kustanay
Petropavlovsk
Omsk
Kokchetav
Shchuchinsk
Stepnyak
Makinsk
Barnaul
Kulunda
Mikhaylovka
Rubtsovsk
Pavlodar
Leninogorsk
Ust'-Kamenogorsk
Zuryanovsk
Semipalatinsk
Zaysan
Ayaguz
Akmolinsk
Atbasar
Yesil'
Temir-Tau
Karaganda
Karkaralinsk
Uralsk
Chkalov
Orsk
Aktyubinsk
Kandagach
Temir
Turgay
Irgiz
Chelkar
Dzhezdy
Balkhash
Mointy
Dzhezkazgan
Baykonur
Aralsk
Kazalinsk
Dzhusaly
Kzyl-Orda
Taldy-Kurgan
Tekeli
Kuldja
Panfilov
Alma-Ata
Przhevalsk
Frunze
Kant
Tokmak
Issyk
Rybachye
Chu
Chulak-Tau
Dzhambul
Talas
Turkestan
Arys
Chimkent
Lenger
Aksu
Uch Turfan
Kucha
Kashgar
Yangihissar
Yarkend
Guma
Khotan
Tashkurghan
Ulughchat
Kok-Yangak
Naryn
Dzhalal-Abad
Namangan
Andizhan
Kokand
Fergana
Osh
Tashkent
Chirchik
Yangi-Yul'
Leninabad
Isfara
Mirzachul'
Dzhizak
Ura-Tyube
Gizhduvan
Bukhara
Kagan
Kattakurgan
Samarkand
Penzhikent
Navoi
Garm
Regar
Stalinabad
Shakhrisyabz
Karshi
Chardzhou
Denau
Kulyab
Kurgan-Tyube
Nizhniy Pyandzh
Faizabad
Khorog
Murgab
Wakhan
Gilgit
Chitral
Peshawar
Jelalabad
Kabul
Andkhui
Mazar-i-Sharif
Khanabad
Shibarghan
Tashkurghan
Maimana
Herat
Kushka
Torbat-e-Haydari
Mashhad
Nishapur
Sabzavar
Shahrud
Semnan
Tehran
Garmsar
Qazvin
Qum
Hamadan
Kermanshah
Ashkhabad
Kerki
Bayram-Ali
Mary
Tedzhen
Iolotan'
Bosaga
Termez
Gonbad-e-Qabus
Bojnord
Shirvan
Quchan
Bandar Shah
Gorgan
Babol'
Kungrad
Chimbay
Nukus
Takhia-Tash
Khodzheyli
Tashauz
Urgench
Turtkul'
Khiva
Krasnovodsk
Nebit-Dag
Kazandzhik
Kyzyl-Arvat
Fort Shevchenko
Kizlyar
Grozny
Dzaudzhikau
Batumi
Tbilisi
Yerevan
Nakhichevan'
Ordubad
Kirovabad
Khachmas
Lenkoran
Astara
Tabriz
Ardabil
Pahlavi
Rasht
Astrakhan
Gurev
Dossor
Stalingrad
Tikhoretsk
Stavropol'
Kuma
Terek
Don
Volga
Ural
Emba
Chu
Talas
Ili
Amu Darya
Murgab
Tedzhen
Sary-Su
Zeravshan
Kara-Darya
Syr-Darya
Irtysh
Ishim
Tobol
Ural
Aral Sea
Caspian Sea
Black Sea
Turkey
Iran
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Kashmir
Sinkiang
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Kirgizia
Tadzhikistan
Georgian S.S.R.
Armenian S.S.R.
Azerbaydzhan S.S.R.
Dagestan S.S.R.

Borders of the U.S.S.R.
Limits of Union Republics.
Capitals of Union Republics.
Railways.
Canals.
Canals under construction or projected.
Sands.
Main arterial road with pass.

J.P. 1958.

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

The above map shows the area covered by *Central Asian Review* in relation to the rest of the U The total area of the six Muslim republics is 1½ million square miles, that is, about 23.5 per cent of the area of Soviet Asia.

The total population of the Muslim Republics is 26,676,000 (1959 Census) or about 41.7 per cent of total population of Soviet Asia now estimated at about 64 million. The figure of 26,676,000 includes 16,06 Muslims, 7,923,000 Russian, Ukrainian and Belo-russian settlers and a number of smaller non-Muslim communities such as Armenians, Koreans, Dungans and Jews amounting to a total of 832,000.

The total indigenous population of Soviet Asia is estimated at 25 million. Thus, whilst the six M republics together occupy only one-fifth of the total area of the region, their indigenous (i.e. Asian) popul amounts to about 66.5 per cent of the indigenous population of the whole of Soviet Asia.

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